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PREFACE 
This dissertation examines empirically the separate 
influences of several structural variables on the innovative 
activity of large multimarket firms. In particular, a 
multiple regression model is formulated to explain the 
variance in the proportion of resources allocated toward 
research and development among a sample of large firms by 
variations in their size, market share, diversification, 
the concentration of their markets, the average growth of 
their markets, and the broad scientific base and technolog-
ical opportunity associated with their primary operations. 
The preparation of this study owes much to the assist-
ance and guidance given me by the members of the thesis 
committee: Dr. Larkin Warner, the chairman, Dr. Frank 
Steindl, and Dr. Luther Tweeten, all from Oklahoma State 
University. Dr.~Warner, especially, has given considerable 
counsel on its content and organization. 
Dr. Willard Mueller (Director of the Bureau of 
Economics) and Dr. Arthur Andersen (Chief of the Division 
of Industry Analysis) were instrumental in enabling me to 
prepare the study as a staff member of the Federal Trade 
Commission. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Mueller who 
originally suggested the topic and has offered a number of 
iii 
helpful comments on its content. Without the material 
support and, particularly, the use of unpublished data 
gathered by the Federal Trade Commission, this thesis would 
not have been possible. 
I also want to thank F. M. Scherer of the University 
of Michigan and Edwin Mansfield of the Warton School of 
Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania who 
read the first draft and offered several constructive 
comments on its content" Thomas Hogarty and William Kelly 
have given useful advice on the statistical measures and 
techniques used. 
Needless to say, none of the above persons are 
responsible for any errors or omissions in the study. 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
I • INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
II. FIRM SIZE, MARKET STRUCTURE, AND INNOVATION: 
THE EXISTING EVIDENCE • • • • • o • • • 11 
The Influence of Firm Size • • • • • • • 11 
Economies of Scale in R&D • • • • • • • 19 
The Influence of Market Concentration. • 22 
The Influence of Diversification • • • • 26 
III. MEASURING THE INFLUENCE OF MARKET STRUCTURE 
ON INNOVATIVE PERFORMANCE FROM UNCONSOLIDATED 
FIRM DATA ••• • • • • • • • • • . . . . . . 35 
The Sample: Its Origin and Biases • o • 35 
The Dependent Variable • • • • • • • • 41 
The Definition of Research and 
Development. • • • • • • • • •• 
The Uncertainty of R&D Investment. 
The Relation Between R&D Employment 
. . 
• • 
and Expenditires ••••••••••• 
The Independent Variables. . . . . . 
Absolute Firm Size • • • . . . . . 
Market Share ••••••••••••• 
Market Concentration • 0 • 
Firm Diversification ••• 
Growth in Market Demand •• 
Technologitil Opportunity. 
-:, 
. . . . . . 
. . . . . 
. . 
IV. FIRM SIZE, MARKET STRUCT_URE AND RESEARCH: 
THE EVIDENCE FROM UNCONSOLIDATED FIRM DATA. 
The Question of Collinearity: Absolute 
Size Versus Diversification and 
43 
44 
51 
55 
55 
57 
62 
64 
66 
68 
73 
Structural Market Power. • • • • • • • 75 
The Empirical Results. • • • • • • • 78 
The Influence of Firm Size • • • • • • 81 
The Influence of Market Power. • • 82 
The Influence of Diversification • • • 91 
The Influence of Market Growth • • • 94 
Scientific and Technological 
Opportunity •••••••• 
v 
. . . . 95 
Chapter 
v. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
APPENDIX A 
APPENDIX B 
vi 
Page 
99 
108 
112 
120 
Table 
1 • 
2. 
3. 
4. 
LIST OF TABLES 
Funds for R&D as a Percent of Sales by 
Industry and Size of Company, 1965 
Computed Value of b for Eight Industry 
Groups Sampled by Hamberg in 1960 
and Worley in 1955 
Coefficients of Specialization for R&D 
Expenditure and Total Employment 
by Industry. 
Product Field Orientation of Industry 
Research and Development, 1960 •• 
5. Frequency Distribution of Firm Sample by 
Industry and Asset Size Category, 1950 • 
6. Distribution of R&D by Type of Investment, 
1965 
7. Expected Payoff Period of R&D by 
Industries 
8. Trends in Funds for Industrial R&D 
Performance by Source, 1953-65 
9. Percent of Funds for R&D by Industry and 
Sources of Funding, 1965 • 
10. Average Cost per Research Engineer or 
Scientist, by Industry and Size of 
Company, 1951. 
11. 
12. 
Average Cost per Research Worker, by 
Industry and Size of Company, 1951 
Simple Correlation Coefficients Between 
Firm Size and Market Share, Concen-
tration or Diversification • o 
vii 
• 
Page 
14 
• 16 
28 
• 29 
38 
• 46 
48 
49 
50 
52 
54 
76 
Table 
13. Regression Coefficients and Standard 
Errors for Additive Model Explaining 
Differences in Research Intensity 
Among 181 Large Research-Performing 
Firms by Selected Variables 
Characterizing Their Industrial 
Environments • o • 
14. Average Research Intensity and Average 
Market Concentration by Two-Digit 
SIC Industry Group and Total Sample. 
15. Average Research Intensity and Average 
Diversification by Industry Group 
and Total Sample ••• 
viii 
Page 
• • 79 
• • 88 
• • 93 
Figure 
1 • 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
Linear and Nonlinear Net Regression 
Curves Relating Concentration and 
Research Intensity. 
ix 
Page 
86 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an empirical study. Its purpose is to present 
additional evidence on the relationship between the size 
and market structure of an industrial firm and its emphasis 
on technological innovation. More specifically, multiple 
regression techniques are used to test a number of related 
hypotheses which attribute a causal influence on a firm's 
research and development (R&D) effort to its size, market 
share, diversification, and the concentration of its 
markets. 
The Problem 
The writer's interest in the study was stimulated by 
the increasing public debate over the position, originating 
1 . h 2 with Schumpeter but advanced most recently by Galbra1t, 
that the costs and risks of modern technology compel firms 
to become large and to achieve a high degree of market 
1 Joseph A. Schumpter, Capitalism, Socialism, 
Democracy (New York: Harper and Bros., 1942). 
and 
2John K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967). 
1 
2 
power if they are to be technically progressive. 3 Advocates 
oJ this position share the view that large tirms operating 
in highly concentrateq industries are the principal con-
tributors to technological change by virtue of the new or 
improved products and processes which flow from their 
research and development laboratories. 4 Only large firms, 
so the argument goes, are able to afford the expensive 
equipment and the teams of trained specialists necessary 
for contemporary innovation. Furthermore, it is asserted, 
for several reasons, that the willingness and ability to 
invest in costly and risky research increase with the size 
and market power of industrial firms. First, greater 
restrictions against the competitive forcing of prices 
toward short-run marginal costs provide protection against 
the rapid erosion .of the gains from research while increas-
ing the supply of internal funds. Second, a greater number 
of simultaneous R&D projects enables a larger firm to 
3The relationship between invention, innovation, and 
concentration has been the subject of U.S. Congressional 
hearings during which most of the arguments examined by 
this study were discussed and some empirical evidence 
presented. u.s., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Anti-
trust and Monopoly, Hearings, Concentration, Invention, and 
Innovation, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965. 
4 others who have given this thesis added emphasis are 
David Lilienthal in Big Business: A New Era (New York: 
Harper & Bros., 1952); A. D. H. Kaplan in Big Enterprise 
in a Competitive System (Washington: Brookings Institution, 
1954); Henry H. Villard in "Competition, Oligopoly, and 
Research," Journal of Political Economy, LXVI (December, 
1958), 483-97; and John K. Galbraith in American Capitalism: 
The Concept of Countervailing Power (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1952). 
3 
balance its successes against failures and, thereby, to 
receive a more predictable return on its investment. Third, 
the greater experience and more heterogeneous resources of 
a larger, more diversified firm enable it to increase its 
expected returns from research, particularly basic research, 
by increasing the probability that unexpected discoveries 
can be put to commercial use. Fourth, the typically higher 
market share of a larger firm provides it with the stability 
of income necessary for pJ.anning long-range research 
projects. 5 Finally, it is argued that there is no reason 
to fear a lack of competitive pressure to innovate for such 
pressure abounds in oligopolistic industries. Hence, firms 
may avoid price competition in highly concentrated markets 
where mutual interdependence is recognized, but more subtle 
forms of nonprice competition, including the development of 
new or improved products or processes, will flourish. 
5These four arguments are based on the theory of 
capital investment under the assumption that the firm is a 
risk averter, that is, it not only seeks greater expected 
returns from its investments, but it also places a premium 
on the reduction of uncertainty. Other things equal, there-
fore, larger firms with greater market power find investment 
in costly and risky R&D more attractive because they can 
expect (1) higher net future investment returns, (2) lower 
variability in these returns, and/or (3) a longer time 
period over which future investment returns can be dis-
counted to the present. Risk aversion has been a basic 
assumption in several theoretical works. See, for example, 
H. M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection (New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, 1959). Galbraith in the New Industrial State 
places extreme emphasis on the compelling need for firms 
to become large in order to eliminate uncertainty. 
4 
The important issue facing antitrust policymakers is 
not the defense of an industrial system of oniy small firms, 
but whether or not technological progress requires very 
large corporate complexes and levels of concentration 
approaching complete market dominance by a few leading 
firms. 6 Would the combination of firms that are already 
large enough to perform organized research into fewer, 
extremely large conglomerate firms with economic power 
autonomous from the discipline of market forces increase 
the technical progressiveness of the industrial system? 
If such is the case, then antitrust policy traditionally 
concerned with limiting the market power of dominant 
producers by discouraging excessive levels of industrial 
concentration may act as an impediment to technological 
progress. Merger policy concerned with the concentration 
of aggregate economic power into the hands of a relatively 
few large conglomerate firms may need reshaping in the 
light of its influence on innovative performance. However, 
if among firms already engaged in research, increased firm 
size, diversification, and market power beyond moderate 
levels do not increase the intensity of their research 
6This point was emphasized by the then Attorney 
General, Nicholas Katzenbach. Speaking on the subject of 
"Business Size and National Economic Growth," he points out 
that ". • the crucial question is not whether large firms 
conduct more or better research than small firms, but how 
large firms compare with giants and with super-giants." 
An address before the 50th World Convention of the National 
Industrial Conference Board, September 20, 1966, p. 5. 
(Mimeographed) 
5 
efforts, then the evidence does not support the argument 
that antitrust policy which seeks to discoJrage high levels 
of aggregate and market concentration will also reduce the 
level of research and development. 
Scope and Objectives of the Study 
In examining this issue two specific questions are 
asked. First, among firms performing research can differ-
ences in research and development efforts be explained by 
differences in size, market share, diversification, and/or 
market concentration; and, if so, what are the separate 
influences of each of these variables? Second, if any of 
the structural variables do have a·positive influence, does 
it follow that an unlimited increase in the variables leads 
to greater research and development? In other words, does 
some optimal industrial structure for innovative effort 
exist, and, if so, does it require extremely large, conglom-
erate firms and/or very high levels of market concentration? 
Since the hypotheses examined in this study represent 
important structure-performance relationships which may be 
influenced by antitrust policy, it is not surprising that 
such relationships have undergone considerable empirical 
scrutiny in recent 7 years. Attempts to estimate the 
7see Daniel Hamberg, ''Size of Firm, Oligopoly, and 
Research: The Evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics 
and Political Science XXX (Feb., 1964), 62-75; I. Horowitz, 
''Firm Size and Research Activity," Southern Economic 
Journal XXVIII (January, 1962), 298-301; Edwin Mansfield, 
6 
influence of market structura1 variables on the innovative 
performance of large firms have been frustrated, however, 
by the lack of refined data. Not only must measurements of 
firm innovative performance be interpreted carefully, but 
meaningful measures of market structural variable~ for 
large multi-market firms cannot be determined from published 
sources. The difficulty exists because firms generally 
report their sales on consolidated income statements, so 
that the relative importance of each of the firm's markets 
. . 8 to its total operation cannot be measured. Previous 
empirical studies based on a cross section of large firms 
have generally grouped them into broad two-digit or, in 
some cases, three-digit SIC categories. While this allows 
for estimates of the importance of firm size for research 
in technically related areas, it is extremely hazardous to 
draw conclusions concerning the importance of industry 
"Size of Firm, Market Structure, and Innovation," Journal 
of Political Economy (December, 1963), 556-76; F. M. Scherer, 
"Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output 
of Patented Invention," American Economic Review, LV 
(December, 1965), 1097-1125; James S. Worley, "Industrial 
Research and the New Competition," Journal of Political 
Economy, LXIX (April, 1961), 183-86; and Henry G. Grabowski, 
"Determinants of Industrial Research and Development: A 
Study of the Chemical, Drug, and Petroleum Industries," 
Journal of Political Economy LXI, No. 2 (March-April, 1968), 
292-3060 
8The requirement "that a conglomerate firm publish 
data for each of its industries is now under consideration 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission. This issue is 
discussed more fully in U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee 
on Antitrust and Monopoly, Hearings, Concentration and 
Divisional Reporting, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966. 
7 
concentration £rom such broad industry groups. Although 
there have been attempts to relate £our-firm concentration 
ratios to indices 0£ technological innovation £or a cross 
section 0£ more narrowly defined industries, these studies 
have £aced the same di££iculty. Since each company's 
total research e££ort and total sales are classified into 
an industry according to its primary product, narrowly 
defined industry aggregates 0£ consolidated £irm data £ail 
to reflect the importance 0£ other industries, both for 
the company's total sales and for its research outlays. 
The more narrow the industry category is defined the more 
• 9 
acute this problem becomes. 
Despite the limitations of published data, it is 
helpful to examine evidence based on their use. First, i£ 
the relationships found are in general agreement, then 
there is some assurance that the regression estimates, 
though crude, do not reflect systematic estimation errors. 
The influence 0£ absolute £irm size, in particular, may be 
estimated £rom consolidated company data; however, precise 
estimates 0£ the separate influences 0£ variables, such as 
market share and diversification, which are assumed to be 
positively correlated with £irm size cannot be determined 
9scherer, American Economic Review, LV, 1097-1125, 
and in a more recent article, "Market Structure and the 
Employment 0£ Scientists and Engineers," American Economic 
Review, LVII (June, 1967), 524-31, attempts to determine 
the ~n£1uence 0£ market concentration ratios on innovation 
£rom more narrowly defined industries. 
8 
from such data. Second, and perhaps more important for 
interpreting the results of this study, the examination of 
previous results provides a basis of comparison among 
alternative indices of innovative performance. Particularly 
the relation between R&D input and innovative output is 
important in interpreting R&D intensity as an index of 
innovative performance. 
The major contributions of this work, presented in 
Chapters III and IV, stem from a comprehensive body of 
unpublished data gathered by the Federal Trade Commission. 
From these data more meaningful measures of market struc-
tural variables have been derived for a sample of large 
multi-industry firms that perform organized research and 
development. The raw data from which these variables are 
determined consist of the dollar value of shipments in each 
of the firm's five-digit SIC product classes for the 1,000 
largest manufacturers in 1950. 1° For a sample of corpora-
tions performing research during the same year, these data 
are used to derive measures of each firm's weighted average 
market share, the weighted average concentration of it 
markets, its diversification, and, finally, the weighted 
average rate of growth of its markets. The weights assigned 
in each of the averages depend on the relative importance 
lOThey are the data underlying the Federal Trade 
Commission's Report on Industrial Concentration in the 
1,000 Largest Manufacturing Companies: 1950 (Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957). 
9 
of each of the firm's five-digit product markets to the 
firm's total value of shipments. The exact procedures used 
to derive each market structural variable are described in 
detail in Chapter III. In Chapter IV multiple regression 
techniques are used to "explain" the variation among the 
firms' R&D laboratory employment per 1,000 total employees 
by the variation in the firms' size, market share, 
diversification, market concentration, market growth, and 
broad level of technological opportunity associated with 
the same primary two-digit SIC industry category. The 
separate influences of each of these independent variables 
on a firm's innovative effort are estimated from the 
partial regression coefficients •. 
Results and Their Significance 
The regression estimates summarized in Chapter IV 
indicate that among firms already performing organized 
research, differences in their market structures have, at 
most, only a modest influence on their R&D efforts~ 
Furthermore, of those variables which do exhibit a positive 
influence, there appear to be upper limits on their impor-
tance for research. 
Firm size, for example, is found to be an important 
determinant of R&D effort among all firms; however, among 
large firms engaged in organized research, there is no 
general tendency for the proportion of a firm's resources 
allocated toward research to increase with its size. 
10 
Among the market structural variables, diversification is 
found to have a positive influence on a firm's research 
effort; however, the degree of market heterogeneity 
necessary for maximum rese~rch effort is not gre~t. Diver-
sification is more important for research within technically 
related areas which are within the realm of operation of 
moderately large firms. The other market structural vari-
ables are found to have no significant influence on a 
firm's research effort, although there is some evidence 
that a quadratic relation exists between market concentra-
tion and research. More specifically, markets with 
extremely low concentration ratios may be less conducive 
to research than moderately concentrated markets; however, 
when market concentration becomes too hig~ both price and 
nonprice competition (including technical rivalry) may 
decline. A "suggested" optimal market concentration ratio 
may exist when the leading four firms share between 50 and 
60 percent of the market. 
These results suggest that antitrust policies to 
limit the growth of large conglomerates and to prevent 
high levels of market conceritration have no detrimental 
effect on the allocation of resources toward organized 
research and development and, indeed, may contribute 
toward greater research effort by industrial firms. 
CHAPTER II 
FIRM SIZE, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION: 
THE EXISTING EVIDENCE 
Although precise measures of market structural vari-
ables for large multimarket firms cannot be determined 
from the consolidated sales data which they report in their 
income statements, conclusions concerning the influence of 
firm size on technological innovation can be reached with 
some degree of certainty. Conclusions reached by previous 
studies on the influence of market concentration and 
diversification on innovation must be considered tentative 
due to data shortcomings. Nevertheless, it is of interest 
to review the studies' results as a basis of comparison 
with this study. This chapter examines empirical evidence 
from several published sources and reviews the results of 
several previous studies which estimate the influence of 
firm size, market concentration, and diversification on 
the innovative performance of industrial firms. 
The Influence of Firm Size 
Industry data published annually by the National 
Science Foundation have been referred to by several writers, 
11 
12 
notably Villard, 1 as empirical evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that dominance by large firms provides an 
industrial environment most conducive to innovation. 
Several characteristics in this body of data are evident. 
First, firms with over 5,000 employees are more likely to 
engage in organized research and development than are 
smaller firms. Second, among firms performing organized 
R&D, those employing more than 5,000 persons spend a greater 
amount on R&D in the aggregate than do smaller firms. 
Third, for the entire industrial sector firms with 5,000 
or more employees exhibit higher ratios of R&D expenditures 
to net sales, on the average, than do firms employing 
fewer than 5,000 persons. In 1965 companies employing 
5,000 or more spent $12,362 million, ~r 87 percent of the 
total funds spent on R&D in industry. In the same year 
companies employing from 1,000 to 4,999 spent $1,102 
million or 8 percent of total industrial funds spent on 
R&D, and companies employing less than 1,000 spent $734 
2 
million or 5 percent of the total. Also in 1965, companies 
employing greater than 5,000 spent 5.2 percent of net sales 
on R&D, while companies in the 1,000 to 4,999 size category 
1Henry H. Villard, "Competition, Oligopoly, and 
Research," Journal of Political Economy, LXVI (December 
1958), 486 • 
. · 
2National Science Foundation, Basic Research, Applied 
Res~arch, and Development in Industry, NSF 67-12, (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 
p. 22. NSF data is available on a comparable basis since 
1957. 
13 
spent 2.3 percent and companies employing less than 1,000 
3 
spent 1.8 percent. 
A further examination of NSF data reveals two other 
characteristics. First, as shown in Table 1, with~n the 
same industry group the tendency for dollar expenditures 
on R&D as a percent of net sales to rise with the three 
employment size categories is much less evident than in the 
aggregate. Second, company-financed R&D expenditure as a 
percent of net sales is much less dependent on firm size 
than is total R&D expenditure as a percent of net sales. 
In 1965 the category of companies employing 5,000 or more 
spent 2.1 percent of net sales on company-financed R&D, 
while the 1,000 to 4,999 category spent 1.9 percent, and 
the less than 1,000 category spent an average of 1.4 
percent. 4 The reduced importance of firm size when only 
company-financed R&D is examined is explained, of course, 
by the fact that Federal funded R&D is heavily concentrated 
among the largest firms. 
Industry data published by the National Science 
Foundation suggest, therefore, that while firm size is an 
important determinant of organized R&D effort, the extent 
3 Ibid., p • 68. 
4 rbid., p. 78. Although the same industry categories 
exhibit a higher ratio of company-financed R&D to net sales 
among firms in the largest sized categories as for total 
R&D to net sales in Table 1, the differences between the 
ratio of expenditure to net sales among the size categories 
for firms in the same lndustry groups are drastically 
reduced when Federal funded R&D is excluded. 
TABLE I 
FUNDS FOR R&D AS A PERCENT OF SALES BY 
INDUSTRY AND SIZE OF COMPANY, 1965 
14 
Companies with total 
employment of 
Industry Total 
Total 4.3 
Food and kindred products .4 
Textiles and apparel .4 
Lumber, wood prod., and fu rni tu re .5 
Paper and allied products .7 
Chemicals and allied products 4.2 
Industrial chemicals 4.6 
Drugs and medicines 5.9 
Other chemicals 2.3 
Petroleum refining and extraction 1.2 
Rubber products 1. 9 
Stone, clay, and glass products 1.6 
Primary metals .8 
Ferrous products .7 
Nonferrous products • 9 
Fabricated metal products 1.4 
Machinery 4.1 
Electrical equipment 9.4 
Communication and electronics 12.2 
Other electrical equip. 7.0 
Motor vehicles and other transp. 
equipment 3.1 
Aircraft and missiles 28.0 
Professional and Scientific 
instruments 6.2 
Measuring instruments 3.9 
Optical, surgical, and 
photographic instruments 7.2 
Other mfg. .7 
Less 
than 
1,000 
1.8 
(a) 
(a) 
(a) 
(a) 
(a) 
(a) 
3.9 
2.1 
(a) 
1.3 
(a) 
(a) 
(a) 
(a) 
1 .1 
1.7 
5.8 
11.5 
2.9 
1.8 
8.0 
4.9 
5.6 
4.2 
(a) 
1,000 
to 
4,999 
2.3 
.4 
.5 
.5 
.9 
4.3 
4.1 
6.8 
2.6 
• 9 
1.0 
.7 
1.0 
.4 
1.3 
1.0 
2.4 
4.6 
7.6 
2.7 
1.6 
16.1 
5.0 
3.4 
6.2 
.9 
(a) Not available separately but in total. 
5,000 
or 
more 
5.0 
.4 
.5 
.3 
.6 
4.4 
4.9 
5.9 
2.2 
1.2 
2.2 
2.0 
• 7 
.7 
.8 
1.7 
5.4 
10.6 
12.8 
8.5 
3.2 
29.3 
7.2 
3.3 
8.1 
.4 
Source: National Science Foundation, Basic Research, 
Applied Research, and Development in Industry. (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 72. 
15 
to which larger firms are likely to allocate a higher 
prqportion of resources to R&D is dependent, to a large 
exten\ on the firm's primary activity. Furthermore, since 
NSr data do not give a breakdown of average R&D performance 
among larger firms (employing more than 5,000), it cannot 
be determined from such data if limits exist on the impor-
tance of firm size for innovative performance in all areas 
of the industrial sector. 
There is considerable variation in R&D performance 
among larger firms in a number of industries that NSF 
data miss because there is no breakdown of firm size beyond 
5,000 employed. Thu~ when faced with the evidence of the 
National Science Foundation, 5 6 Worley and Hamberg argue 
that the case for bigness would be strengthened if among 
only larger firms performing organized research in an 
industry, R&D increases more than proportional to firm size. 
Using a regression equation of the form Y=AXb, where Y is 
the number of persons employed in R&D by each company and 
Xis total company employment, both Worley and Hamberg 
estimated the parameter b among large firms. 7 For R&D 
5James S. Worley, "Industrial Research and the New 
Competition," Journal of Political Economy, LXIX (April, 
1961), 183-86. 
6Daniel Hamberg, R&D: Essays on the Economics~ Re-
search and Development (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 47. 
7 R&D employment data are taken from National Academy 
of ~ciences, National Research Council, Industrial Research 
Laboratories of the United States, 10th and 11th editions 
(1956 and 1961). 
16 
to increase more than proportional to size, b would, of 
course, have to be signific~ntly greater than one. For 
the eight industry groups both Worley and Hamberg sampled, 
they found the following results: 
TABLE II 
COMPUTED VALUE FOR b FOR EIGHT INDUSTRY GROUPS SAMPLED 
BY HAMBERG IN 1960 AND WORLEY IN 1955 
Industry 
Food and kindred products 
Chemicals and allied products 
Petroleum and products 
Stone, clay, and glass products 
Primary metals 
Machinery (except electrical) 
Electrical machinery 
Transportation equipment 
* Significant at .01 level. 
I 
** Significant at .05 level. 
b 
(Hamberg) 
1960 
0.767 
1.156 
*1.397 
*1.842 
**0.665 
1.249 
1.291 
1.304 
b 
(Worley) 
1955 
0.638 
1.071 
**1.229 
1.317 
0.885 
1.226 
1.285 
1.011 
Hamberg finds b greater than one at the 5 percent 
level only for the petroleum, the primary metals, and the 
stone, clay, and glas~ industries, while Worley finds b 
significantly greater than one only in petroleum. Although 
both researchers conclude from this evidence that research 
intensity does not increase with firm size, F. M. Scherer 
has pointed out that the statistical methodology and data 
used lead to significant biases which render their results 
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questionable. 8 In particular, the use of the logarithmic 
transformation of the independent and dependent variable 
places too much weight on the smaller-sized firms when the 
relation is not monotonic. Measurement error in the scale 
variable also has the effect of biasing the research 
elasticity consistently downward. It is also important 
to note that the analyses of Hamberg and Worley apply only 
to firms actually performing research and, hence, their 
results do not describe the relationship between firm size, 
and the decision to undertake research. 
The influence of firm size on research intensity is 
also likely to depend on the homogeneity of the sample of 
firms with respect to their technologies. Hence, when 
William Comanor estimated the research elasticities of 
twenty-one more homogeneous three-digit SIC industries or 
two-digit SIC industries with dummy variables to separate 
three-digits within the two-digit category, he generally 
found the coefficients of bin the exponential equation to 
decline. The elasticities found by Comanor exceed unity 
in only six cases of the twenty-one when the dependent 
variable includes only professional research personnel and 
in only ten cases of the twenty-one when total R&D employ-
9 
ment is used. Although none of the elasticities are found 
8F. M. Scherer, "Size of Firm, Oligopoly, and Research: 
A Comment," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political 
Science, XXXI, no. 2 (May, 1965), 256-66. 
9william S. Comanor, "Market Structure, Product 
Differentiation, and Industrial Research," The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, LXXXI (November, 1967), 639-57. 
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to be significantly greater than one, seven of the twenty-
one regression coefficients are found to be significantly 
less than one at the 5 percent level. In contras~ Hamberg 
found elasticities greater than one in twelve out of the 
seventeen broader industries he examined.lo 
If the relationship between research intensity and 
firm size has a point of inflection, then the exponential 
equation assumed in the methodology first used by Worley 
is clearly inappropriate. Scherer has estimated the 
re~ationship betw~en R&D employment and firm sales for 
selected two-digit SIC industry groups using polynomials 
of the form 
+ u. 
1 
where RDi is 1955 R&D employment and Si is 1955 sales for 
the ith firm. 11 He finds that the relationship between 
R&D employment and firm size has a point of inflection in 
most industry categories sampled. For the total sample he 
finds that research intensity increases with size among 
lOThe stone, clay, and glass products industry is 
particularly heterogeneous. Hence, when dummy variables 
are added for each three-digit SIC category, the research 
elasticity estimated by Comanor is 0.80 which is signifi-
cantly negative. Hamberg found the research elasticity on 
a two-digit basis to be 1.84 which is significantly positive. 
11 scherer, The Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science, XXXI, no. 2, 261-66. The logarithm is 
a technique used to suppress the values of extremely large 
firms. 
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firms with sales of less than roughly $500 million but 
decreases with firm size for firms with greater than $500 
million in s~les in 1955. 12 He does find several important 
exceptions, however, among the industries he examined. The 
chemicals industry as a whole and the giant leaders of the 
automobile and steel industries displayed increasing R&D 
intensity with sales. 
Economies of Scale in R&D 
Of particular importance for this study is the relation 
between innovative output per unit of R&D input and firm 
size. Since the hypotheses examined by this study are 
specifically concerned with the willingness and ability of 
firms to invest in research and development, R&D input is 
used as the dependent variable. However, if economies of 
,scale in R&D are important among research-performing 
firms, then larger firms contribute more to the nation's 
technological progress than their research and development 
efforts would suggest. 
Scherer has examined the relationship between not 
only firm size, measured by 1955 sales, and R&D input, 
measured by the number of R&D employment in the firm's 
R&D laboratories, but also the relation between firm size, 
measured by the same size variable, and innovative output, 
measured by the number of patents issued to the firm in 
12Ibid., pp. i64-5o 
1959. Estimating nonlinear polynomials of the form 
Yi= ao + al X1 + a2 X22 + a3 xi3 
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for 448 of Fortune's list of the 500 largest corporations 
in 1955, he found nonlinear regressions of R&D employment 
on sales which generally paralleled those estimated for 
patents on sales, although the regressions of patents on 
sales generally exhibited less pronounced nonlinearities 
than the corresponding R&D on sales equations. He did, 
however, find some evidence of diminishing returns to R&D 
input intensity. The more R&D employees per million dollars 
of sales a firm retained, the more patents per million 
dollars of sales it received, but at a decreasing rate. 13 
Jacob Schmookler measured patent output per 'R&D input 
for firms of different size classes in several research 
intensive industries, and concluded that, for the industries 
sampled, the largest firms are less efficient in their 
innovative output per R&D input than are the somewhat 
smaller firms. 14 
Although the number of patents is the only practical 
output measure for a large sample of firms, Edwin Mansfield 
measures inventive output by the number of significant 
13 F. M. Scherer, "Firm Size, Market Structure, Oppor-
tunity, and the Output of Patented Inventions," The American 
Economic Review, LV (December, 1965), 1097-125. R&D 
employment includes professionals and supporting personnel. 
14u.s., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust 
and Monopol~ Hearings, Invention, Innovation, and Concen-
tration, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, pp. 1257-69. 
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inventions by a small sample of firms in the chemical, 
petroleum, and steel industries. Holding firm size fixed, 
he finds a strong positive relation between R&D expend-
itures and the output of significant inventions, but 
innovative output increases more than proportional to R&D 
input only for the chemical industry. In petroleum and 
steel the number of significant inventions increases in 
proportion to the amount of R&D effort. Hence, economies 
of scale are not important in two of three industries he 
studied. 15 
Perhaps the most reasonable conclusion concerning the 
importance of scale economies is that it varies according 
to the nature of the R&D activity of the firm. If the firm 
is engaged in the development of highly technical systems, 
such as ballistic missile or communication systems, then 
scale economies may be quite large. However, for the 
development of such items as electrical components, instru-
ments, or drugs, the firm with only one gifted scientist 
and a small staff of supporting personnel may be all that 
is necessary to perform efficiently. Among large firms 
primarily in industries in which R&D projects ~re generally 
financed by company funds, the minimum size necessary for 
an efficient R&D program does not appear to be a significant 
15 Edwin Mansfield, "Industrial Research and Develop-
ment Expenditures Determinants, Prospects, and Relation of 
Size of Firm and Inventive Output,'' Journal of Political 
Economy, LXXII, No. 4 (August, 1964), 334-37. 
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barrier to innovation. Indeed, the greater difficulty in 
communication and coordination of larger scale R&D programs 
has been cited as a cause of diseconomies of scale in 
16 
research and development. 
The Influence of Market Concentration 
Empirical studies concerned with a direct structure-
performance relationship between market concentration and 
innovation have related aggregate industry indices of 
innovation with four-firm industry concentration ratios. 
In several of these studie~ 20 or fewer two- and three-
digit SIC categories are used. Hamberg, for example, 
computed least squares and rank correlation coefficients 
between (1) industry aggregates of company-financed R&D 
expenditures and four-firm concentration ratios and (2) 
average industry company-financed R&D to sales ratios and 
the same measure of industry concentration, all data for 
the year 1958. He found coefficients of .56 and .46, 
respectively, for the first relation and .54 and .36, 
respectively, for the second. All coefficients except the 
last are significant at the 17 .05 level. 
16see, for example, the testimony of Arnold C. Cooper 
in the U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings on Invention, 
Innovation, and Concentration, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, 
pp. 1293-307. 
17Hamberg, R&D: Essays on the Economics of Research 
and Development, pp. 63-65. I. Harowitz in "Firm Size and 
Research Activity," Southern Economic Journal, XXVIII 
(January, 1962), 298-301 finds a similar positive relation 
between research and concentration. 
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Although broad industry groups generally include the 
majority of sales by large multimarket firms, it is 
improbable that any two such firms classified in the same 
broad category according to their primary product market 
would operate in the same markets in the same proportion 
with each other or with the group average. Henc-e, as 
Scherer observes, it is impossible to determine precisely 
"what has been cooked in the stew" in 18 such a procedure. 
To hold some of the other variables besides concentration 
constant while narrow~ng the boundaries of the industries 
he observes, Scherer utilizes a selected sample of indus-
tries from an FTC report for 1950. 19 From those industries 
in the FTC report he draws a sample of 48 which meet the 
following criteria: (1) The industry can be meaningfully 
defined in terms of economic analysis. (2) Bureau of 
Census coverage ratios are at least 75 percent for indus-
tries with concentration ratios less than 50 percent and 
85 percent for industries with higher concentration ratios. 
(3) Primary product sales are at least 75 percent of 
industry sales. (4) The broad parent industry (two-digit 
SIC category) is suitable for making and patenting inven-
ti-ons. ( 5) Industry technology is such that patents can 
18 Scherer, American Economic Review, LV, 1118. 
19u.s. Federal Trade Commission, Report on Industrial 
Concentration and Product Diversification in the 1,000 
Largest Manufacturing Companies: 1950 (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1957). 
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be meaningfully classified. (6) Among industries meeting 
the above conditions, those exhibiting a wide variation in 
technologies, concentration ratios, and total sales are 
chosen. Scherer uses a multiplicative regression model 
to "explain" the variation in the number of patents issued 
in 1954 to the four leading firms in each industry by the 
variation in the firms' sales in 1950, their share of total 
industry sales in 1950, and two slope dummy variables to 
differentiate industries in chemicals and in electricals. 
The regression coefficient for the market share variable 
suggests that structural market power, if it has any 
influence, is 20 extremely modest. 
More recently from another sample of industries, 
however, Scherer finds market concentration to have a 
positive influence on the employment of scientists and 
engineers in an . 21 industry. Furthermore, Scherer finds 
empirical support for the neo-Schumpeterian hypothesis 
that a quadratic relation exists between market concentra-
tion and research intensity. As concentration rises the 
employment of R&D personnel per 1,000 total employees in 
an industry increases up to a point and then decreases. 
20 Scherer, American Economic Review, LV, 1118-21. 
21 scherer's latter sample is taken from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bu~eau of Census, Census of 
Population: 1960, "Occupation by Industry_," (Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963). His results are 
published in "Market Structure and the Employment of 
Scientists and Engineers," A_merican Econorriic Review, LVII, 
No. 3 (June, 1967), 524-31. 
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He concludes from this empirical evidence that higher 
concentration beyond very low levels may have a favorable 
influence on research; but if industries become too highly 
concentrated,the implicit collusion that often occurs 
against price competition in oligopolistic markets may be 
extended to other forms of nonprice competition, such as 
rivalry in research. For his sample of industries Scherer 
finds an "optimal" range of concentration for research 
when the four leading firms share between 50 to 55 percent 
of the total industry's value of shipments. 
According to William Comanor, concentration may be 
considered to have two distinguishable effects on the level 
of research in an industry. The first is the firm size 
effect which arises from the obvious relationship between 
concentration and the relative size of the leading firms 
in an industry. The second effect is the market power 
effect which refers to the relation between concentration 
and market power and the latter's effect on research. In 
an empirical study on the relation between concentration 
and research, Comanor attempts to estimate the separate 
22 influences of each of these two effects. His results 
suggest that while simply increasing the size among larger 
firms in an industry is unlikely to lead to greater R&D, 
2 2comanor, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXI, 
645-52. The multiple regression model employed in Chapter 
IV of this study will allow for similar estimates of these 
separate influences; however, it will approach the question 
at the level of the individual firm. 
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there is evidence that in some market situations higher 
concentration, holding firm size constant, is associated 
with increased research. In particular, in markets where 
prospects for achieving product differentiation are limited 
(consumer nondurables and material inputs) there is evidence 
of a positive relationship between industry concentration 
and research. However, in markets where product differ-
entiation possibilities are high and, as a result, 
competition in research is likely to be important, there 
is no evidence that increased concentration leads to more 
research. 
The Influence of Diversification 
One of the difficulties in estimating the influence 
of the size distribution of firms in an industry on 
technological innovation from industry aggregates is that 
data are generally compiled on a basis of the company as 
the reporting unit. Large diversified firms which are 
classified into an industry by their primary product may, 
in fact, operate across many product markets. Since a 
diversified firm may not restrict its innovative efforts 
to products or processes closely related to its primary 
activity, its innovative performance may not be influenced 
entirely by the level of concentration in its primary 
. d t 23 1n us ry. 
23 In Scherer's analysis of the difference in patent 
output among·industries mentioned above, he attempts to 
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A measure frequently used to measure diversification 
is the complement of the specialization ratio, that is, 
one minus the ratio of primary industry shipments to total 
shipments of all firms in an industry. Hence, the lower 
the specialization ratio, the higher the degree of diversi-
fication. The specialization ratio can, of course, be 
applied to any measure of firm output. During the hearings 
before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 
Richard Nelson presented specialization ratios for R&D 
outlays, equal to the percent of R&D expenditures by firms 
in an industry directed toward the industry's primary 
24 products. Table 3 summarizes his results and compares 
them with the average of the 1958 and 1963 employment 
specialization ratios derived from the Bureau of the Census' 
Enterprise Statistics. 25 A comparison between R&D and 
mitigate this problem by selecting industries with 
relatively specialized firms and by counting only those 
patents which pertain to the primary activity of the four 
leading firms in each industry. American Economic Revie~, 
LV, 1118-21. 
24 U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust 
ahd Monopoly, Hearings, Invention, Innovation, and 
Concentration, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, p. 1141. 
25 Employment specialization ratios rather than ship-
ment specialization ratios were used because the 1958 and 
1963 Enterprise Statistics provide a matrix of employment 
by Enterprise category. Since employment in the primary 
industry was determined for a broad two-digit level of 
aggregation, the off-diagonal elements within the same 
broader category were also included. An average of 
specialization ratios by narrower classification under-
states the employment of the primary industry. 
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TABLE III 
COEFFICIENTS OF SPECIALIZATION FOR R&D EXPENDITURE 
AND TOTAL EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY 
Industry 
Aircraft and missiles 
Chemicals 
Electrical equipment and 
communication 
Fabricated metals 
Food and kindred products 
Machinery 
Motor vehicles and other 
transport equipment 
Petroleum 
Primary metals 
Professional and scientific 
instruments 
Rubber products 
Specialization ratios 
1960 Emploi-
R&Da ment 
67.9 77.2 
80.3 77.4 
5 8. 7 63.6 
32.4 80.3 
78.1 88.9 
51.4 75.0 
58.1 91.0 
52.6 88.5 
5 8. 8 73.8 
32.0 80.9 
33.9 87.5 
aComputed by Richard Nelson from National Science 
Foundation, Research and Development in Industry, 1960 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 
80-81. 
bAverage of employment specialization ratios computed 
from U.S., Bureau of the Census, Enterprise Statistics 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962 and 
1968), Table 6. 
employment specialization ratios indicates that, except 
for chemicals, R&D expenditure is less specialized within 
the primary industry of the firm than is total employment. 
Although R&D expenditures are diversified, it has not 
led to a diversification of R&D over product fields for the 
entire manufacturing sector. Table 4 presents an array of 
R&D expenditures on applied research and development by 
product field'in 1960. If R&D expenditures are ranked 
TABLE IV 
PRODUCT FIELD ORIENTATION OF INDUSTRY 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 1960 
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Product field Cost of R&D ($ millions) 
Percent of 
total R&D 
Applied Research and Develop-
ment, total 
Guided missiles and spacecraft 
Communication equipment and 
electronic components 
Aircraft and parts 
Chemicals 
Machinery 
Atomic Energy devices 
Motor vehicles and other trans. 
equipment 
All other product fields 
$10,121 
2,192 
2, 184 
1,200 
887 
755 
613 
553 
1,737 
96.3 
21.7 
21.6 
11.9 
8.8 
7.5 
6.1 
5.5 
13.2 
Source: National Scierrce Foundation, Basic Research, 
Applied Research, and Development in Industry, 1965 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 89. 
according to their product field or their primary industry, 
the same familiar names head the list, namely, aircraft 
and missiles, electronics, chemicals, and machinery. It 
follows, therefore, that diversified firms primarily 
operating in research oriented industries seek out other 
research oriented industries into which they diversify 
their R&D activities. Firms in research intensive indus-
tries with a well defined scientific base, such as chemicals 
or aircraft and missiles, on the other hand, appear to 
find their greatest immediate payoff in fields in which 
they already operate. Therefore, firms in these industries 
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tend to specialize their R&D programs within a relatively 
narrow range of product fields. 26 
Several researchers have related indices of diversi-
fication to innovative performance at the firm level to 
test the hypothesis of Nelson that a diversified firm is 
likely to be more research intensive, since it is better 
able to exploit unexpected research outputs than a more 
specialized firm and, therefore, can expect higher future 
27 
returns from R&D. Since company sales for multimarket 
firms are published on a consolidated basis, the measures 
introduced by these researchers are based upon a numerical 
count of the existing product markets of the firm. 
Scherer measures firm diversification by the number 
of "technologically meaningful" industries in which the 
28 
company operates. Introducing this variable into 
regressions of patents on sales, patent intensity on sales, 
R&D on sales, and patents on R&D for 448 large corporations, 
26Table 3 shows that in chemicals especially, firms 
tend to specialize their R&D outlays. 
27 1 • • f • Richard Nelson, 'The Simple Economics o Basic 
Scientific Research," Journal of Political Economy, 
LXVII (June) 1959), 297-306. Although Nelson argues in 
terms of more risky basic research, uncertainty is an 
important component of all R&D, and, therefore, the 
diversification hypothesis is worth testing. 
28 He derives roughly 200 "technological meaningful" 
industries by consolidating the 447 SIC four-digit manu-
facturing industries. 
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he finds a significant reduction in unexplained variance 
29 
case. in every 
When, however, Scherer regressed patents on sales and 
diversification in 14 two- and three-digit industry groups, 
allowing each subsample to assume its own best-fitting 
sales and diversification coefficients, he found a total 
reduction in unexplained variance of only 1.05 percentage 
points beyond the contribution of simple linear regressions 
of patents on sales. Although this increment was signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level in an F-ratio test, there was 
a decline in explanatory power of approximately 12 per-
centage points for his index of diversification. This 
decline in explanatory power suggests that Scherer's 
diversification index acted partly as a surrogate dummy 
. . 30 
variable to separate industry groups. 
An alternative measure of firm diversification is 
used by Grabowski. For companies primarily in the petroleum, 
chemical, and drug industries, he measures diversification 
by the number of separate five-digit SIC product classi-
fications which have some potential relevance to R&D 
activity. Holding interfirm differences in internal 
availability of funds and research productivity constant, 
29when his index of diversification is added to a 
regression of patents on sales the variance in patenting 
is reduced by 13 percent. Similar results were found in 
each of the other regressions with at-ratio of its regres-
sion coefficient of 5.0 or more. Scherer, American 
Economic Review, LV, 1115. 
30Ibid. 
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he finds that diversification exerts a positive influence 
on research and development expenditures as a percent of 
31 
sales. 
Although the empirical results of Scherer and Grabowski 
suggest that structural diversification has a favorable 
influence on R&D investment, such an interpretation should 
be made with caution due to the limitations of measures 
of diversification based upon the number of existing product 
32 
markets of the firm. One limitation in such measures 
is that a numerical count fails to give relative weight to 
the firm's primary markets versus other markets which are 
less important to the firm's total sales. A second limita-
tion, which is particularly important in testing Nelson's 
hypothesis, is that such indices fail to measure the degree 
of heterogeneity of the firm's factors of production and 
marketing channels of distribution. For example, a firm 
may operate in six product markets all in chemicals and 
31 Henry Grabowski, "The Determinants of Industrial 
Research and Development: A Study of the Chemical, Drug, 
and Petroleum Industries," iournal of Political Economy, 
LXXVI, no. 2 (March-April, 1968), 292-306. The data for 
the number of 5-digit product classes are taken from the 
Fortune Plant and Product Directory,1961. Availability 
of internal funds is measured by last year's cash flow, 
deflated by current sales. R&D productivity is measured 
by the number of patents per R&D employee. 
32This is not a criticism of their approaches to 
measuring diversification; however, it does point out the 
problem of measuring structural diversification for 
conglomerate firms reporting consolidated sales data. 
exhibit more homogeneous factors of production and more 
closely related, functionally, products than another firm 
operating in only two product markets, but one each in 
chemicals and food products. Finally, the structural effect 
of diversification is more meaningful if rates of market 
growth in demand among firms are held constant. Hence, 
diversification may have a greater influence on a firm's R&D 
investment behavior if the primary markets of the firm offer 
few opportunities for its homogeneous growth.33 
Summary 
The empirical evidence reviewed in this chapter leads 
to several general conclusions concerning the influence of 
firm size and market structure on innovation. First, while 
large firms are more likely to undertake organized research 
than smaller firms, the tendency for larger firms already 
performing organized R&D to allocate a higher proportion 
of their resources to innovative activity depends, to a 
large extent, on the primary activity of the firm. In some 
industries larger firms are necessary to undertake extremely 
sophisticated research. Evidence on the performance of 
only the largest firms, however, indicates that upper 
limits exist on the importance of firm size for research 
33see Michael Gort, Diversification and Integration 
in American Industry (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1962), pp. 104-5, for a discussion of the relation-
ship among diversification, growth in market demand, and 
technological change. 
34 
in even the most technically oriented industries. Second, 
evidence from several sources suggests that economies of 
scale in R&D laboratories may be significant in certain 
industries. However, firms in these industries generally 
perform organized research which is heavily financed by 
Federal funds. Third, evidence on the structural influence 
of the size distribution of firms in an industry is mixed. 
Attempts to correlate the four-firm concentration ratio 
with measures of innovative performance have found no 
relation in some studies but have found a significant 
positive relation in others. The inconsistency of these 
results probably reflects the limitation of aggregate 
industry data for measuring the size distribution of 
markets for diversified firms reporting on a company basis. 
Fourth, there is evidence that diversification and techno-
logical research are positively related, and that diversified 
firms tend to seek out technically oriented industries in 
which to concentrate their R&D activities. This relation-
ship can be more firmly established, however,. if more 
meaningful measures of firm diversification are used. 
CHAPTER III 
MEASURING THE INFLUENCE OF MARKET STRUCTURE 
ON INNOVATIVE PERFORMANCE FROM 
UNCONSOLIDATED FIRM DATA 
The methods and procedures of developing measures of 
the market structure and innovative performance of indus-
trial firms determine to a large extent the usefulness of 
interpretations derived from their analysis. From the 
empirical results based on industry or consolidated firm 
data, it is apparent that policymakers need more precise 
information concerning the separate influences of market 
power and diversification on innovative performance. In the 
empirical analysis which comprises the balance of this study, 
more meaningful estimates of the influences of several 
market structural variables on innovative performance are 
determined b~sed upon unconsolidated firm data. 
The Sample: Its Origin and Biases 
Because of the time-consuming efforts necessary to 
develop each measure of market structure for the firm, 
certain limits are established on the selection of a cross 
section of firms in order to keep the study within reason-
able bounds. First, only publicly-owned corporations 
35 
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among the largest 1,000 in sales in 1950 are examined, 
since smaller firms are not included in the FTC Corporate 
1 Pattern Survey. The data gathered by the FTC for each 
firm consist of the dollar value of shipments in each 
five-digit SIC product class in which the firm operated 
in 1950. A copy of the form sent out to each company is 
in Appendix B. 2 Second, only firms whose primary product 
markets are in the following major industry categories are 
included: (1) food products, except beverages; (2) chemical 
and allied products; (3) petroleum products; (4) stone, 
clay, and glass products; (5) primary metal products; and 
(6) motor vehicles and equipment. These particular cate-
gories are chosen because they provide a cross section of 
the manufacturing sector and because they performed a 
small proportional amount of Federal financed R&D, accord-
3 ing to a 1951 survey by the Department of Labor. Third, 
1only food manufacturers among the largest 500 in 
1950 are examined in order to keep the number of such firms 
at a reasonable level compared to the other industries 
represented. 
2 In computing the measures of the independent variables 
based on the FTC Corporate Pattern Surve~ only those pro-
duct classes contributing as much as 1 percent to the total 
shipments of the firm are examined, so that the lengthy 
computational process can further be reduced. The exclusion 
of product classes which contribute less than 1 percent 
does not alter the measurements significantly. In the food 
products industries the same measures were computed using 
all product classes and in no case was the measure altered 
as much as 1 percent. 
3u.s. Department of Labor, Scientific Research and 
Development in American Industry, Bulletin No. 1148 (Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 76-77. 
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only those companies reporting the number of employees in 
their research laboratories for 1950 in the National 
Research Council's Industrial Research Laboratories of the 
United States 4 are included. 
The sample satisfying these three conditions consists 
of a fairly large (181) collection of firms with a repre-
sentative number from each of the major industry categories. 
A frequency distribution of the sample by industry category 
and size class is given in Table 5. The actual firms 
included in the sample are listed by industry in Appendix A. 
This selection process leads to certain biases as a 
representative sample of all manufacturi~g firms. First, 
it excludes a number of important research-performing firms 
which operate primarily in industry groups other than the 
six examined. For example, firms in the aircraft and parts 
or electrical equipment industries employed 42.8 percent 
of all R&D personnel in manufacturing in 1952, but they 
are deliberately excluded from the sample because 85.1 and 
57.0 percent of their R&D, respectively, was financed by 
5 
the Federal Government. Second, the sample includes only 
relatively large firms which reported their R&D employment 
in 1950. Hence, conclusions reached from this sample are 
4National Academy of Sciences, National Research 
Council, Industrial Research Laboratories of the United 
States, 9th ed. (Washington, D.C., 1956). 
5u.s. Department of Labor, Scientific Research and 
Development_ in American Industry, pp. 59 & 78. 
TABLE V 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF FIRM SAMPLE BY INDUSTRY 
AND ASSET SIZE CATEGORY,a 1950 
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Firms with assets in $ millions 
Industry 
Food and kindred 
products 
Chemicals and 
Total 
number 
42 
allied products 49 
Petroleum extraction 
and refining 27 
Stone, clay, and 
glass products 19 
Primary metals 24 
Motor vehicles and 
transp. equipment 20 
Total 181 
Less 
than 
50 
17 
25 
17 
8 
10 
7 
84 
5 0 100 
100 200 
13 
13 
4 
7 
4 
4 
45 
7 
6 
5 
3 
2 
5 
28 
200 
or 
above 
5 
5 
1 
1 
8 
4 
24 
aThe range of asset size is from $11.1 million for the 
smallest firm to $4,188.0 million for the largest firm. 
concerned only with the influence of market structure and 
size on the R&D performance of firms performing organized 
research, and no conclusions can be reached concerning 
their influence on the decision to undertake organized 
research and development. 
An alternative to speaking of a biased sample is to 
say that the selection process enumerates very nearly a 
specific universe. In this universe the typical firm is a 
fairly large firm that is engaged in organized research 
and development financed primarily by company funds and 
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operates in several, at. least moderately concentrated, 
markets. Although the sample is not representative of all 
manufacturing firms, it is representative of the industrial 
giants referred to by Galbraith as essential for techno-
logical innovation. 
Although dated, the year 1950 is relevant to the time 
period when most of the arguments favoring larger firms 
', 6 
and more concentrated markets for research were formalizedo 
Empirical evidence from several sources suggests that the 
importance of the size distribution of firms in an industry 
to the level of research and development performed in that 
industry may not have changed appreciably since 1950. Hence, 
research elasticities estimated by Hamberg in 1960 are in 
close agreement with those estimated by Worley in 1955. 7 
Mansfield's estimates of the elasticities of research 
expenditures with respect to firm sales among large firms 
in the chemical, petroleum, drug, steel, and glass indus-
tries during the period 1945 to 1959 revealed no systematic 
change in the research elasticities among firms in these 
. d t . t. 8 1n us r1es over 1me. Furthermore, National Science 
6The Schumpeterian thesis was first published in ~942, 
and the arguments of Galbraith, Lilienthal, Kaplan, and 
Villard appeared in the literature during the 1950's. See 
supra, ch. I, pp. 1-2. 
7 See supra, p. 14. 
8Edwin Mansfield, "Industrial Resea'rch and Development 
Expenditures: Determinants, Prospects, and Relation to 
Size of Firm and Inventive Output," The Journal of Political 
Economy, LXXII, no. 4 (August, 1964)~27-37. 
4& 
Foundation data available on a comparable basis from 1958 
to 1965 reveal similar patterns of company~financed R&D 
expenditures as a percent of net sales across three employ-
ment size categories, less than 1,000 e-ployees, 1,000 to 
4,999 employees, and 5~000 employees or more. 9 However, 
the influence of market structure on a firm's research 
intensity may have changed over time, but more conclusive 
evidence will not be forthcoming until unconsolidated sales 
data for multiple product firms, similar to that used in 
this study, are made available for a more recent time 
period. 
Although recent conglomerate merger trends have 
increased industrial diversification, many of the large 
firms in the sample were considerably diversified in 1950. 
However, while such firms often operated acr~ss several 
two-digit SIC industry categories in 1950, the sample 
cannot be taken as representative of so-called "pure'' 
conglomerates that operate in many markets which are 
neither technically nor functionally related. Neverthe-
less, 1950 estimates of the influence of diversification 
probably represent more than mere historical evidence of 
its importance for R&D investment. 
9National Science Foundation, Basic Res~arch, 
Applied Rese~~ch, and Development in Industry, 1965 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 
p. 69. 
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The Dependent Variable 
Although there is no completely accurate measure of 
innovative performance available for a large sample of 
firms, the measure used in this study is the number of R&D 
employees in the firm's R&D laboratory or laboratories per 
1,000 total company employees in 1950. R&D employment is 
the most frequently used measure of R&D performance by 
the firm. R&D expenditures are not readily available from 
10 published sources at the firm level. 
The only practical alternative measure of innovative 
performance available from published sources for a large 
sample of firms is the number of patents issued to the 
firm during a representative period of time. For several 
reasons, however, R&D employment rather than patents was 
chosen as the dependent variable. First, since the 
Schumpeterian thesis is concerned specifically with the 
influence of firm size and market power on a firm's willing-
ness and ability to invest in costly and risky research, 
it is theoretically more correct to use a measure of R&D 
input rather than innovative output. Second, since the 
10 R&D employment data for each firm are taken from 
the National Research Council's, Industrial Research 
Laboratories of the United States (1950). Since the 
hypotheses are concerned with the decision to allocate a 
higher. proportion of resources to R&D, the dependent 
variable is expressed as a measure of intensity ~ather 
than the absolute level of R&D employment. R&D employment 
includes both professionals and supporting personnel. 
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number of patents a firm seeks is more variable over time 
than is R&D employment, patent data may not be as desirable 
in cross-section analysis that estimates structural influ-
ences in the underlying relationships which are relatively 
stable over time. 11 Third, comparisons of patents among 
firms may be misleading due to different "propensities to 
patent," that is, differences in the r..umber of patents a 
firm seeks relative to the number of inventions or innova-
tions it makes. The very fact that a firm possesses 
monopoly power may lower the number of patents it seeks, 
since the more a firm approaches industrial domination, the 
less it needs patents to give it monopoly control over the 
inventions used. Although large firms may avoid patents 
to maintain secrecy, the short-run marginal cost of 
patenting may be lower for large firms with a staff of 
in-house patent attorneys. To use patent counts to measure 
innovative performance, therefore, may lead to differences 
among firms of different market structures that are not a 
reflection of differences in their innovative activity. 12 
11 For cross-section studies patent data should be 
averaged over, at least, a 3-5 year period. See Dennis c. 
Mueller, "Patents, Research and Development, and the Measure 
of Inventive Activity." The Journal of Industrial Economics, 
XV, no. 1 (November, 1966), 26-37 for a discussion of this 
problem as well as a comparison between patent and R&D 
figures to measure inventive activity. His conclusion is 
that "both patents and R&D data, if employed with caution, 
may provide the researcher with satisf2ctory indexes of 
inventive activity." 
12 F. M. Scherer recognizes the pr0blem of interfirm 
and interindustry differences in the prupensity to patent. 
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The Definition of Research and Development 
In interpreting the intensity of R&D employment as an 
index of innovative performance, the nature of the innova-
tive output likely to result from resources allocated to 
organized research and development should be considered. 
The definition of R&D used by the National Science Founda-
tion for classifying statistical measurement is as follows: 
Research and development includes basic and applied 
research in the sciences and engineering, and design 
and development of prototypes and processes. 
It excludes quality control, routine product testing, 
market research, sales promotion, sales service, 
research in the social sciences or psychology, or other 
nontechnological activities or technical services. 1 3 
Although the National Science Foundation has attempted 
to distinguish between R&D and more routine design improve-
ments, there is little doubt that companies include as R&D 
the more or less routine work that goes into yearly changes 
in model design. An examination of Westinghouse's R&D 
activities, for example, revealed the following breakdown 
of expenditures: 2 percent was for "blue sky" research 
that was not connected in any way with current products, 
Accounting for differences among industries with dummy 
variables, he assumes interfirm differences in the same 
major industry category to be a random disturbance which, 
unless correlated with one of the independent variables, 
serves only to increase the unexplained variance in his 
regression equations. See "Firm Size, Market Structure: 
Opportunity, and the Output of Patented Inventions," 
American Economic Review, LV (December, 1965), 1258. 
13National Science foundation, p. 119. 
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3 percent for long-range major developments, 6 percent for 
continuations of promising past research, 10 percent for 
stand~rd product development, and 79 percent for develop-
ments required for customer-tailored equipment. 14 
The Uncertainty of Research and Developmeny Investment 
An ideal cJ.assification of R&D performance would 
relate R&D activities to the possibilities cf future 
. . 15 
appl1cat1on. Certainly the risk of ihvestmcnt in activ-
ities with an uncertain future payoff is much greater than 
the risk associated with a customer-tailored development 
expenditure having a fairly certain application. 
The breakrlown by the National Science Foundation of 
R&D into the three categories of basic research, applied 
research, and development expenditures allows for some 
consideration of aggregate firm b~havior regarding invest-
ment outlays with different possibilities of future 
application., The National Science Foundation defines basic 
research to "include the cost of research projects which 
represent original investigation for the advancement of 
scientific knowledge and which do not have specific commercial 
-------·----
14 U.S, Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Concentration, 
Invention,, and Innovation, 89th Cong., !st Sess., 1965, 
pp. 1244-4,5. 
15 Da'T'.d Novick suggests such a classification in his 
testimony ~efo~e the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 
Ibid., pp 1241-56. 
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objectives, although they may be in the fields of pcesent 
or potential interest to the reporting company.•r Applied 
research "includes the cost of research projects which 
represent investigation directed to discovery of new 
scientific knowledge and which have specific commercial 
objectives with respect to either products or processes." 
Note that this definition of applied research differs from 
the definition of basic research chiefly in terms of the 
objectives of the reporting company. Development "includes 
the cost of projects which represent technical activity 
concerned with nonroutine problems which are encountered 
in translating research finding or other general scientific 
knowledge into products or processes. 1116 Table 6 is a 
percentage distribution of R&D investment into these three 
components. For all industries only 4 percent of R&D was 
for basic research while 77 percent was for development. 
Basic research appears to be most promising when firms are 
in industries having a scientific base, such as chemicals, 
drugs, and petroleum. Development expenditures appear 
more significant in industries based upon mechanical devices 
such as machinery, electrical equipment, and aircraft and 
missiles. 
The degree of certainty involved in a particular type 
of R&D investment expenditure is also related to the length 
16National Science Foundation, p. 121. 
TABLE VI 
i 
DISTRIBUTION OF R&D BY TYPE OF INVESTMENT, 1965 
Percent of total industry R&D 
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Industry Basic Applied Development Total 
Food and kindred 
products 
Textiles and apparel 
Lumber, wood products, 
furniture 
Paper and allied 
products 
Chemicals 
Petroleum extraction 
and refining 
Rubber products 
Stone, clay, and glass 
products 
Primary metals 
Fabricated metal 
products 
Machinery, except 
electrical 
Electrical equipment 
Motor vehicles and 
transp. equipment 
Aircraft and missiles 
Instruments 
All industries 
7 
5 
(a) 
2 
12 
12 
5 
6 
6 
2 
2 
5 
3 
1 
(a) 
4 
47 46 100 
44 51 100 
(a) (a) 100 
37 61 100 
39 49 100 
38 50 100 
24 71 100 
37 56 100 
(a) (a) 100 
22 75 100 
13 85 100 
14 82 100 
(a) (a) 100 
14 84 100 
(a) (a) 100 
19 77 100 
(a) Not separately available but included in total. 
Source: National Science Foundation, Basic Research, 
and Development, 1965 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 19 6 7), p • 7 8 • 
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of time expected for the investment to pay off. Table 7 
shows the percent of companies in a number of industries 
which expect their R&D expenditures to pay off in 3 years 
or less, 4 to 5 years, or 6 years or more. For all manu-
facturing industries represented by the McGraw-Hill survey, 
55 percent of the companies expected a payoff of 3 years 
or less from their R&D expenditures. In contrast, only 
11 percent of the companies in all manufacturing expected 
a payoff 0£ over 6 years from their R&D investment. 
Both the emphasis on development expenditures and on 
a short expected payoff period lend support to the assumption 
that most firms are risk averters, that is, they prefer 
investments with a short payoff period and relatively 
certain future applicability to investments having a longer 
payoff period and more uncertain future applicability. 
An evaluation of the risk involved in R&D investment 
must consider the source of funding. The use of Federal 
funding rather than company funding eliminates the market 
risks and incentives to which the Schumpeterian hypotheses 
are solely applicable. Table 8 reveals that Federal funds 
have accc)Tmted for over one-half of all expenditures for 
industrial research and development since 1956. Although 
the Federal Government finances over 50 percent of all 
R&D performed in manufacturing, it is largely concentrated 
ln the electrical equipment and aircraft and missile 
\ 
Lndustries. Table 9 presents the source of funding by 
industry .1.n 1965. The trend toward a higher percentage of 
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TABLE VII 
EXPECTED PAYOFF PERIOD OF R&D BY INDUSTRIESa 
Indus try 
Iron & steel (ferrous) 
Nonferrous metals 
Machinery, not electrical 
Electrical machinery 
Autos, trucks, and parts 
Transportation equipment 
Fabricated metals and instruments 
Chemicals 
Paper and pulp 
Rubber 
Stone, glass, and clay 
Petroleum and coal products 
Food and beverages 
Textiles 
Misc. marketing 
All manufacturing 
Percent of companies ex-
pecting payoff in 
3 years 4 to 5 6 years 
or less years or more 
38 50 12 
64 18 18 
51 39 10 
61 32 7 
54 40 6 
43 44 13 
77 14 9 
33 41 26 
50 32 18 
38 38 24 
38 46 16 
17 33 50 
54 43 3 
76 24 0 
71 25 4 
55 34 11 
aThe McGraw-Hill survey usually consists of the larger 
firms. Together they employ about 40 percent of all workers 
in industry. The survey question was: "How soon do you 
expect your expenditures on research and development to 
pay off?" 
Source: McGraw-Hill, Department 0£ Economics, pub-
lished in National Industrial Conference Board, Economic 
Almanac, 1967-1968 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1967), 
p. 241. 
TABLE VI I I 
TRENDS IN FUNDS FOR INDUSTRIAL R&D 
PERFORMANCE BY SOURCE, 1953-65 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
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Federal Company 
Year 
Total 
R&D 
1965 $14,197 
1964 13,512 
1963 12,630 
1962 11,464 
1961 10,908 
1960 10,509 
1959 9,618 
1958 8,389 
1957 7,731 
1956 6,605 
1955 4,640 
1954 4,070 
1953 3.,630 
Percent of 
Amount total 
$7,759 55 
7,720 57 
7,270 58 
6,434 56 
6,240 57 
6,081 58 
5,635 59 
4,759 57 
4,335 56 
3,328 50 
2,180 47 
1, 750 43 
1,430 39 
Percent of 
Amount total 
$6,438 45 
5,792 43 
5,360 42 
5,029 44 
4,668 43 
4,428 42 
3,983 41 
3,630 43 
3,396 44 
3,277 50 
2,460 53 
2,320 57 
2,200 61 
Source: National Science Foundation, 67-12 (1965). 
total industry R&D financed by the Federal Government 
reflect~ to a large exten~ the growing importance of 
publicly-supported R&D in these two industries which are 
growing rapidly relative to other manufacturing industries. 
TABLE IX 
PERCENT OF FUNDS FOR R&D BY INDUSTRY 
AND SOURCES Of FUNDING, 1965 
Company-
financed 
Industry Total (percent) 
Food and kindred products 100 99 
Textile mill products and 
app are 1 100 (a) 
Lumber, wood products, 
furniture 100 (a) 
Paper and allied products 100 100 
Chemicals and allied products 100 86 
Petroleum extraction and 
refining 100 84 
Rubber products 100 85 
Stone, clay, and glass 
products 100 97 
Primary metals 100 96 
Fabricated metals 100 89 
Machinery, except electrical 100 77 
Electrical machinery 100. 38 
Motor vehicles and transp. 
equipment 100 74 
Aircraft and missiles 100 12 
Instruments 100 68 
All manufacturing 100 45 
50 
Federally 
financed 
(percent) 
1 
(a) 
(a) 
14 
1 6 
15 
3 
4 
11 
23 
62 
26 
88 
32 
55 
(a) Not separately available but included in total. 
Source: National Science Foundation, NSF 67-12 (1965). 
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The Relation Between R&D Employment and Expenditures 
Table 10 shows that the cost per research scientist 
or engineer increases with the size of research-performing 
firms. There are two reasons for this relationship. First, 
larger companies typically employ a higher ratio of support-
ing personnel per scientist or engineer than do smaller 
companies. Second, larger firms are generally more capital 
intensive in their R&D activity than are smaller firms. 
The relatively low support ratios and less capital intensive 
R&D programs of smaller companies are attributed partly 
to the fact that such firms contract out much of their 
subprofessional work to drafting firms and machine shops 
because their work volume does not warrant the maintenance 
of staff and equipment to perform these functions. 
ever, it is probably also true that the cost per R&D 
scientist or engineer depends upon the nature of the 
How-
research program itself. Research is more labor intensive 
than is development. For example, in the transportation 
equipment and electrical equipment industries, two indus-
tries which performed a relatively high proportion of 
development relative to research activity, the cost per 
research scientist or engineer is relatively high. Among 
different sized companies in the same industry, smaller 
firms are probably more willing to undergo R&D work at its 
initial stag~ when its unit costs are lower but the uncer-
tainty of future payout is highe~ than are larger firms. 
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TABLE X 
AVERAGE COST PER RESEARCH ENGINEER OR SCIENTIST, 
BY INDUSTRY AND SIZE OF COMPANY, 1951a 
Industry 
Food and kindred 
products 
Textiles and apparel 
Paper and allied 
products 
Chemicals and allied 
products 
Industrial chemicals 
Drugs 
Petroleum extraction 
and refining 
Rubber products 
Stone, clay, and glass 
products 
Primary metals 
Fabricated metals 
Machinery, except 
electrical 
Electrical machinery 
Transportation equip-
ment 
Motor vehicles 
Aircraft and parts 
Instruments 
Other manufacturing 
All manufacturing 
All Less than 500 to 5,000 or 
Com- 500 4,999 more 
panies employees employees employees 
$17.0 
19.2 
13.5 
16.5 
18.2 
16.4 
20.9 
13.6 
18.6 
21.5 
16.5 
18.3 
28.1 
27.6 
68.6 
24.3 
17.9 
19.4 
22.5 
$10.6 
10.2 
11.4 
12.5 
12.2 
10.2 
20.5 
12.8 
13.3 
14.5 
16.0 
16.4 
19.0 
22.2 
12.4 
24.3 
16.0 
15.0 
15.6 
$15.0 
19.6 
12.1 
14.7 
12.9 
17.6 
17.9 
18 .1 
13.7 
16.8 
15.9 
20.9 
18.1 
27.3 
31.1 
26.0 
14.9 
21.7 
18. 4 
$18.2 
20.0 
15.4 
17.9 
19.6 
16.9 
21.0 
13.4 
19.7 
22.6 
17.8 
16.6 
32.4 
27.7 
75.5 
24.1 
19.6 
17.1 
24.4 
aCosts are in hundreds of dollars. 
Source: Department of Labor, Scientific Research and 
Development in American Industry (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1953), pp. 82-83. 
The low-cost high-risk exploratory work which is initiated 
by a small company (or independent inventor) is subsequently 
taken over by large companies willing to undergo the less 
risky, but higher cost development work. For example, 
Willard Mueller found that of the twenty-five important new 
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innovations introduced by DuPont from 1920 to 1950) fifteen 
were based upon work initially performed by small companies 
or independent inventors outside of DuPont. 17 
Since the ratio of supporting personnel to R&D 
scientists and engineers generally increases with the size 
of the firm, the variance in cost per research worker 
among different sized firms is less than the variance in 
cost per scientist or engineer. Table 11 gives the cost 
per research worker among industries and different sized 
companies in January 1951. When compared with Table 10, 
it is evident tha~ especially in the motor vehicle industry, 
the support ratio increases with firm size. It is also 
apparent from a comparison of Tables 10 and 11 that the 
use of R&D employment (research professionals plus support-
ing personnel) as a dependent variable gives less weight 
to the R&D performance of larger firms than if R&D expend-
itures were used. However, more weight is given to the 
largest firms than if only the employment of R&D scientists 
or engineers is used as the dependent variable. Total R&D 
employment is chosen as the principal dependent variable 
because it is more closely aligned with the firms' R&D 
investment expenditures. However) since there is some 
evidence that the employment of research professionals is 
1 7Willard F. Mueller, "The Origins of the Basic Inven-
tions Underlying DuPont's Major Product and Process 
Innovations, 1920 to 1950," The Rate and Direction of 
Inventive Activity: Ec6nomic and Social Factors (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 323. 
TABLE Xl 
AVERAGE COST PER RESEARCH WORKER, BY 
INDUSTRY AND SIZE OF COMPANY, 1951 
(Costs are in hundreds of dollars) 
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All Less than 500 to 5,000 or 
Food and kindred 
products 
Textiles and apparel 
Paper and allied 
products 
Chemicals and allied 
products 
Industrial chemicals 
Drugs 
Petroleum extraction 
and refining 
Rubber products 
Stone, clay, and glass 
products 
Primary metals 
Fabricated metals 
Machinery, except 
electrical 
Electrical machinery 
Transportation 
equipment 
Motor vehicles 
Aircraft and parts 
Instruments 
Other manufacturing 
Com- 500 4,999 more 
panies employees employees employees 
$8.7 
8.5 
7.1 
7.9 
7.8 
9.2 
8.1 
7.2 
6.6 
10.1 
7.9 
8.0 
9.4 
10.0 
10.9 
9.7 
7.5 
8.7 
$5.8 
7.1 
5.6 
6.9 
7.7 
6.7 
7.4 
8.7 
7.7 
9.9 
7.6 
8.3 
8.4 
7.8 
8.0 
7.8 
7.6 
8.3 
$8.7 
11.2 
6.5 
8.2 
7.1 
9.8 
6.9 
8.4 
7.1 
5.6 
7.5 
808 
7.6 
9.5 
7.5 
9.4 
6.9 
9.0 
$8.8 
7.2 
8.0 
7.9 
8.0 
9.1 
8.1 
7.1 
6.5 
11.5 
8.6 
7.4 
10.0 
10.0 
11.2 
9.8 
7.6 
8.2 
Source: Department of Labor, Scientific Research and 
Development in American Industry (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1953), pp. 88-89. 
more closely related to significant research undertakings 
than is total R&D employment, regression equations are also 
estimated with R&D employment less supporting personnel as 
. b 18 the dependent var1a le. These regression coefficients 
18In a study of the drug industry, Comanor found that 
the number of research professionals was more closely 
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will be noted only if they lead to significantly different 
results from those obtained when using total R&D personnel. 
The Independent Variables 
The independent variables in the regression analysis 
are the firm's absolute size, its average market share, 
the average concentration of its markets, its diversifica-
tion, the average growth in output of its markets, and the 
broad level of scientific and technological opportunity 
associated with its operations. Each of these variables 
is expected to have a positive influence on a firm's 
research intensity. With the exception of the measures of 
firm size and scientific and technological opportunity, 
these measures are derived from data gathered in the FTC 
Corporate Pattern Survey. 
Absolute Firm Size 
The hypothesis that larger firms are likely to invest 
in proportionately more research than somewhat smaller 
firms is based upon the assumption that firms are risk 
averters, that is, they attach a premium to the reduction 
related to the output of the research facility than was 
the total number of research personnel. He measured 
research output in terms of new products weighted by their 
sales during the first two calendar years following their 
introduction. See William S. Comanor, "Research and 
Technical Change in the Pharmaceutical Industry," Review 
of Economics and Statistics, LXVII (May, 1965), 182-90. 
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f t . t 19 o uncer a1n y. A greater number of simultaneous R&D 
projects enables a larger firm to balance its successes 
against failures and, thereby, to receive a morepred~table 
return on its R&D investment. Therefore, even if future 
R&D investment returns have the same expected value among 
different sized firms, the variability of such returns is 
expected to be lower for larger firms. Since this lower 
variability reduces uncertainty, it can be argued that, 
other things equai, 20 larger firms will find risky research 
relatively more attractive than somewhat smaller firms. 
The measure of firm size introduced in this study as 
an independent variable is total assets since it is the 
most widely used measure of conglomerate size. If the 
proportion of resources allocated to research by the firm 
increases with firm size, then the partial regression 
coefficient of the size variable is expected to exceed 
zero. 
Although the choice of a measurement of absolute firm 
size is somewhat arbitrary, it is likely to lead to 
different results if the sample of firms is not homogeneous 
19The importance of firm size for reducing uncertainty 
is given extreme emphasis by J. K. Galbraith in The New 
Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967). 
20In the multiple regression analysis to follow the 
market structure and technological opportunity of the firm 
are held constant; however, the degree of management's 
aversion to risks is not because it could not be adequately 
measured. It will be assumed, however, that interfirm 
differences in the degree of management's aversion to risks 
are random and, unless correlated with one of the .independent 
variables, serve only to increase the unexplained variance. 
57 
with regard to factor proportions. Suppose, for example, 
firms are ranked according to their employment size, then 
labor intensive firms (those with a high labor-to-output 
ratio) would rank higher than if ranked by asset~ or output. 
Similarly, capital intensive or highly integrated firms 
would rank higher by assets than by other measurements. 
~ 
In order to satisfy the condition of homogeneity with regard 
to factor proportions, the sample of firms are separated 
by dummy variables into subgroups. It is then assumed 
that differences in factor proportions among firms in the 
same subgroup are random, leading to no systematic bias 
21 
in the regression coefficient for the size variable. 
The selection of the subgroups will be discussed in a later 
section of this chapter. 
Market Share 
Schumpeter argues that a larger market share increases 
the willingness and ability of an industrial firm to invest 
venture capital in new and improved products artd processes 
because it provides protection against the temporary 
disorganization of the market necessary for long-range 
investment, while increasing the supply of internal funds. 
21 when total employment was used as an alternative 
size measure rather than total assets and dummy variables 
were included for each two-digit SIC industry group, the 
regression coefficients for the two size measures yielded 
substantially the same results. Hence, the assumptiort of 
intraindustry homogeneity of factor proportions appears 
valid. 
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The measure of market share for each firm introduced 
in the study is a weighted average of the firm's share of 
each of its product markets. It is computed by multiplying 
the firm's shipments in each of its product markets by its 
share of the total shipments in that market, summing over 
all the product markets of the firm, and dividing by the 
I h" t 22 company s totals 1pmen s. 
Since market share is measured by the firm's sales 
relative to total market sales, the first procedure in 
determining a market share for each of the firm's markets 
is to define each market's boundaries. Defining a partic-
ular market is extremely difficult since it is at best an 
arbitrary process; however, for purposes of determining 
weighted averages for the firm, it was found convenient 
to proceed on a basis of the industry definitions of the 
Bureau of the Census' Standard Industrial Classification 
at the five-digit level of aggregation. On a basis of 
substitutability or "cross-elasticity of demand" the five-
ctigit level of aggregation is probably more relevant than 
broad.er three- or even four-digit levels, although the 
broader categories may be more relevant from the supply 
22Although this procedure gives greater weight to the 
market shares of the firm's primary markets, that is, those 
markets in which it has the greatest shipments, in many 
instances the firm holds a larger share of markets which 
comprise a relatively small proportion of its total ship-
ments. This occurs, of course, because market share also 
depends on the size of the market. 
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side. 23 There is one exception to the SIC system ot defin-
ing markets which cannot be overlooked, ana that is the 
market for beet and cane sugar. Since the two types of 
sugar are classified into two categories but are perfect 
substitutes the shipments of the two categories are combined 
for the purpose ot determining the firm's share of the 
market. 
The relevant market for each product may also be 
restricted by geographic location, depending on tne nature 
ot the product and the method of its distribution. Because 
of the availability of adequate distribution channels, most 
of the markets examined are considered national in scope. 
However, there are several exceptions. The markets for 
prepared animal feeds; inorganic chemicals, not elsewhere 
Ciassified; fertilizers; petroleum refining; paving mixtures 
and blocks; hydraulic cement; gray iron toundaries; and 
aluminum castings are considered to be regional markets. 
The markets for ice cream and frozen desserts, fluid milk, 
and bread and related products are considered as state 
24 
markets. 
23 Dr. Frank Kottke, who was responsible for the FTC 
Corporate Pattern Survey while a staff member of the Bureau 
of Economics, holds this posi~ion after years of working 
witn the Standard Industrial Classification. 
24 These industries are among those selected by the 
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly as being 
charac~erized by local or regional marketing. Other s~udies 
correct tor geographic boundaries in these industries. See, 
for example, the coefficient of geographic dispersion 
derived by Collins and Preston in Concentration and Price-
Cost Margins in Manufacturing Business lBerkeley and Los 
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The market shares of all but the geographic markets 
and.the market for sugar for each firm's markets are derived 
by dividing the firm's value of shipments from the FTC 
Corporate Pattern Survey in each of its five-digit SIC 
product classes by the 1950 value of shipments of all firms 
in the same product class. For selected five-digit product 
classes the total shipments are taken from the Bureau of 
Census' Annual Survey of Manufactures: 1951. For the 
five-digit product classes not available from this source, 
total shipments for the years 1947 and 1954 are taken from 
the Bureau of Census' United States Census of Manufactures: 
1954. To obtain an industry figure for 1950, it is assumed 
that changes in the value of shipments fr6m 1947 to 1954 
followed linear trend. 25 a 
For the several regional and state markets, the 
following adjustment in industry shipments on a national 
basis is made to allow for geographic boundaries. From 
Part II of Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing Industry, 
1963 a weighted average four-firm concentration ratio of 
the several regions of the United States is derived for 
each of the regional markets by multiplying the concentration 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1968); and George 
Stigler, Capital and Rates of Return in Manufacturing 
Industries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). 
2 5The exact value is three-sevenths of the difference 
between 1954 and 1947 shipments added on to 1947 shipments. 
Data from the 1954 volume are gathered on a basis of the 
1950 codes to account for changes in the SIC system. 
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ratio in each region by the value of shipments in that 
region, summing over all regions, and dividing by the United 
States total shipments. For the state markets a similar 
weighted average is taken except among the state concentra-
tion ratios. Since these ratios are given on a four-digit 
basis, the five-digit categories of the firm in these 
four-digit groups are summed together for purposes of 
aetermining their market share. To obtain a value of the 
industry shipments on a regional or state basis, the total 
1950 U.S. value of shipments is divided by the ratio of 
the 1963 regional or 1963 state to 1963 national four-firm 
concentration ratios to determine a smaller industry total 
t d f h . b d . 26 correc e or geograp 1c oun ar1es. 
After the firm's share of each of its product markets, 
adjusted for geographic boundaries, is determined, the 
weighted average marKet share previously described is 
computed for each of the 181 firms in the sample. 
26since the regional or state concentration ratio is 
invariably higher that the national concentration ratio, 
the ratio of regional or state to U.S. concentration ratios 
is greater than one. Hence, when the U.S. indus~ry total 
is divided by this ratio its value is reduced. 
This deflation procedure assumes that the shipments of 
all firms are distributed in 1950 is the same proportion 
as the top four firms in 1963. Although the method is not 
ideal, it leads to a better measure of market share and 
concentration for regional and state markets than it no 
corrections are made. 
The 1963 concentration data are published in a report 
prepared by the Bureau of the Census for the U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 89th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., 1966. 
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Market Concentration 
To ~easure the level of concentration in the firm's 
markets, a weighted average four-firm concentration ratio 
and a weighted average eight-firm concentration ratio are 
derived for each firm. While these ratios or any other 
single statistic do not fully describe the number and size 
distribution of firms in a market, they are generally 
acknowledged to capture the essential feature of the dis-
tribution, namely, the combined market position of the 
leading firms. Theoretical arguments and increasing 
empirical evidence indicate that high levels of market 
concentration increase the probability that a market behaves 
II • • • 11 27 ol1gopol1st1cally. 
The procedure used to determine the measures of 
concentration is similar to that used to determine a 
weighted average market share except that the percent of 
shipments by the top four and top eight firms can be found 
directly from published data. The four-firm and eight-firm 
concentration ratios for each five-digit product market, 
except those for sugar and the several regional markets, 
are taken from the Report of the Senate Subcommittee on 
Antitrust and Monopoly, Concentration in American Industry, 
27 see, for example, Joe s. Bain, "Relation of Profit 
Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manufacturing, 
1936-1940," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXV (August, 
1~51), 293-324; and Leonard W. Weiss, ''Average Concentration 
Ratios. and Industrial Performance," Journal of Industrial 
Economics, XI (July, 1963), 237-54. 
6J 
1954.28 For the sugar industry weighted averages of the 
four-firm and eight-firm concentration ratios .for beet and 
cane sugar are used. For the regional markets the four-
firm concentration ratio is the weighted average of the 
U.S. regional concentration ratios in 1963. T6.determine 
an eight-firm concentration ratio on a regional basis, it 
is assumed that the share held by the eight leading firms 
relative to the share of the top four firms on a regional 
basis is proportional to the share of the top eight relative 
to the top four on a national basis. Hence, the U.S. 
eight-firm concentration ratio is multiplied by the ratio 
of the four-firm regional to four-firm U.S. concentration 
ratios. The same procedure is used to determine the 
four-firm and eight-firm concentration ratios for the state 
markets except that state rather than regional weighted 
averages are used. To obtain a weighted average four-firm 
concentration ratio for each firm, the four-firm concentra-
tion ratio in each product market is multiplied by the 
firm's shipments in that market, summed over all product 
markets of the firm, and divided by the firm's total value 
or shipments. The same procedure is applied to the eight-
firm concentration ratio for each product market to derive 
28 U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957. 1954 is the first 
year concentration ratios are available for five-digit 
product classes. Since concentration ratios are relatively 
stable over time, this is not likely to change tne 1950 
measurement significantly. Of course, allowance is made 
for changes in SIC codes between 1950 and 1954 to obtain 
data for the same markets. 
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a weighted average eight-firm concentration ratio for the 
firm. The procedure is repeated for both measures for all 
181 firms in the sample. 
Firm Diversification 
There are several alternative measures of firm diver-
sification which could be derived from unconsolidated 
29 
market data. The measure most relevant for producing 
and marketing new innovations, however, is the degree of 
heterogeneity of the firm's existing product markets and 
factors of production. If a firm operates exclusively in 
a narrowly defined market, it may be at a disadvantage 
in producing and marketing an unrelated discovery relative 
30 to a firm operating across widely heterogeneous markets. 
As the heterogeneity of a firm's existing markets increases, 
then, presumably, the probability that the firm will both 
29
see Michael Gort, Diversification and Integration 
in American Industry (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1962), pp. 23-25 for measures he derived from 
unpublished Bureau of the Census tabulations of unconsoli-
dated firm data. 
30
rn his theoretical model of a multiproduct firm, 
Eli Clemens argues that with excess capacity any reasonable 
market accessible to the firm in which price exceeds 
marginal cost constitutes an invitation to entry. Firms 
with excess productive ca9acity across varied markets can 
generally move into new markets at a lower marginal cost 
than more specialized firms with more homogeneous resources. 
Of course, an alternative to developing new markets and 
processes within the firm is to acquire other firms in the 
are a and use the i r fa c i 1 it i e s • See E 1 i C 1 em ens , "Pr i c e 
Discrimination and the Multiple-Product Firm," The Review 
of Economic Studies, XIX (1950-51), 1-11. 
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recognize the commercial value and be able to market new 
discoveries is increased. Since the ratio of successes 
to failures in costly and risky R&D is higher, the expected 
future return on the firm's R&D investment rises. Other 
things equal, therefore, more widely diversified firms are 
expected to be more research intensive. 
To develop a measure of heterogeneity of markets and 
factors of production tor tne firm, it is assumed that as 
shipments are grouped into more narrowly defined SIC 
categories, the factors of production and marketing 
channels of distribution become more homogeneous. Since 
the ratio of a firm's shipments in its primary SIC category 
to its total shipments yields a measure of homogeneity, 
tne complement of this ratio provides a measure of diversi-
fication. The degree of heterogeneity ot this measure 
depends on the definition of the primary SIC category. If 
the primary SIC category is defined very narrowly at the 
five-digit level, a firm may have a high percent of ship-
ments outside the category and still utilize fairly 
homogeneous factor inputs or produce functionally related 
products within the same four-digit category. As the 
primary SIC category is defined more broadly, however, a 
higher percentage of shipments outside the primary industry 
indicates greater heterogeneity of factor inputs and 
product markets. In this study three alternative measures 
of d1versification are introduced. The first measure of 
diversification is the percent of the £irm 1 s shipments 
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outside its primary four-digit SIC category. The second 
measure is the percent of shipments outside its more broactly 
defined primary three-digit SIC category. The third 
measure is the percent of shipments outside its still 
31 broader two-digit SIC category. \ 
Growth in Market Demand 
In examining the partial influence of absolute size, 
market power, and diversification on innovative performance, 
the rate of growth in market demand is held constant. 
Market structure is, by nature, relatively stable over 
t . 32 h 1me; owever, structural influences may be offset by 
disequilibrating forces such as a high rate of growth in 
demand. 
A study by Michael Gort found that market shares are 
33 likely to be more stable in highly concentrated markets. 
Rapid growth, however, generates instability in several 
ways. First, with imperfect foresight firms adjust their 
31 Although a firm's shipments includes vertically 
related markets, the effect of integration is eliminated to 
some degree by the exclusion of five-digit product classes 
contributing less than 1 percent to the firm's total ship-
ments. By and large, such products constitute materials 
used in the production of other products. 
32see Richard Caves, American Industry: Structure, 
Conduct, Performance (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 31-34. 
33Michael Gort, "Analysis of Stability and Change in 
Market Shares," The Journal of Political Economy, LXXI 
(February, 1963), 51-61. 
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scale of production to anticipated growth differently, 
leading to shifts in market shares. Second, recurrent 
lags in the adjustment of supply to growth in demand may 
result in an above normal rate of return which attracts 
new entry and consequent shifting in market shares. Barriers 
to entry limit the number of firms entering a market in 
response to growth in demand; however, among markets with 
the same entry barriers rapidly growing markets are more 
likely to encourage entry than less rapidly growing markets. 
A firm can generally be expected to undertake new 
activities rather than grow within the scope of its existing 
product structure if the former alternative promises a 
higher expected return. This prospective future return on 
investment (whether for diversification or for homogeneous 
growth) depends upon, among other variaoles, growth in 
demand. Hence, while firms may possess the same degree of 
homogeneity among existing markets, their patterns of R&D 
investment may differ considerably, depending upon the 
34 
relative growth in demand in their markets. _ 
A measure of growth in demand for the firm's markets 
is determined as follows: An index of growth for each of 
34Jacob Schmookler has stressed the importance of 
growth in demand in a number of articles. See, for 
example, his "Changes in Industry and in the State of 
Knowledge as Determinants of Industrial Innovation'' in 
~he Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, pp. 195-232; 
"Economic Sources of Inventive Activity," Journal of 
Econ_omic History, XXII (March, 1962), 1-2; and with Oswald 
Brownlee_, "Determinants of Inventive Activity," American 
Economic Review, Lil (May, 1962), 165-76. 
the firm's five-digit product markets is determined by 
dividing the total product class shipments in the market 
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in 1950 by the same total in 1947 and multiplying by 100. 
A weighted average index of growth for the firm's markets 
is measured by multiplying the growth index in each five-
digit market by the firm's shipments in that market, 
summing over all of the firm's markets, and dividing by the 
firm's total value of shipments. 
for all 181 firms in the sample. 
Technological Opportunity 
The procedure is repeated 
There is considerable variation in innovative per-
formance among the 181 firms in the sample that cannot be 
accounted for by any of the above variables describing the 
size and market structure of the individual firm. Much of 
this variation can be attributed to a set of influences, 
described by Scherer under the heading of "technological 
opportunity," 35 which characterize the firm's broad field 
of technology. Some of these influences are undoubtedly 
related to industry traditions or demand conditions not 
reflected by market structure or growth, such as consumer 
tastes and preferences, durability or perishability of 
products, and trade credit practices. However, this set of 
influences, as Scherer observes, "is most likely to be 
associated with dynamic supply conditions dependent in turn 
35scherer, American Economic Review, LV, pp. 1099-103. 
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upon the broad advance of scientific and technical knowl-
36 
edge." In certain fields of technology, a vigorous 
scientific climate assures an almost continuous supply of 
technical possibilities th&t are much more limited in other 
technology fields. In the regression model presented in 
the following chapter; differences in technological oppor-
tunity among firms in different fields of technology will 
be analyzed through the use of dummy variables which assume 
a different value for each two-digit SlC category. Inter-
firm variation in technological opportunity within the 
same two-digit category can be viewed as a random disturbance 
which, unless correlated with some independent variable, 
imparts no bias to the regression estimates of R&D inten-
sity, only increasing the unexplained variance. 
In introducing inte~cept dummy variables to separate 
technology fields, it is necessary to take certain steps 
to avoid a singular matrix. More precisely; the dummy 
variable for food manufacturing is omitted, so that only 
five dummies are introduced for the six two-digit SIC 
categories represented. 37 Each dummy variable assumes a 
value of 1 for firms primarily in the same two-digit 
category and O otherwise. The regression coefficient for 
36Ibid., p. 1100. 
37see Daniel B. Suits, ''Use of Dummy Variables in 
Regression Equations," Journal .. of American. Statistical 
Association, LI! (1957), 548-51, for a discussion of this 
technique. 
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each dummy variable, therefore, represents a shift in the 
intercept between food manufacturing and the corresponding 
38 
two-digit category. 
Summary 
The basic analytical problem of this study is that of 
multivariate analysis, that is, reducing and interpreting 
the data contained in a matrix of "n" observations and "p" 
variates. This chapter has discussed the nature and 
character of both dimensions of this matrix. 
The observations comprise a sample from a universe 
of the 1,000 largest manufacturing firms in 1950. As a 
representative of all manufacturing firms the sample has 
certain biases: (1) it includes only publicly-owned 
corporations reported in Moody's Industrials; (2) it has 
no representatives from certain important industries in the 
manufacturing sector; (3) it includes only firms among the 
1,000 largest in 1950; and (4) it includes only those 
firms reporting R&D employment in Industrial Research 
Laboratories of the United States (1950). The sample is 
representative, however, of large manufacturing firms 
engaged primarily in company-financed R&D in organized 
research laboratories. It provides, therefore, an adequate 
3 83. Johnston in Econometric Methods (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 222 also discusses this technique 
and interprets the regression coefficients obtained for 
intercept dummy variables. 
sample for testing the assertions of those favoring an 
industrial environment of only a few large conglomerate 
firms as optimal for research. 
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The variables in the model are as follows: (1) firm 
innovative performance measured by its employment in R&D 
laboratories per 1,000 total employees in 1950; (2) 
absolute firm size measured by total assets in 1950; (3) 
market share measured by a weighted average of the firm's 
share in each of its five-digit product classes in 1950; 
(4) market concentration measured by a weighted average 
four-firm concentration ratio and a weighted average eight-
firm concentration ratio of the firm's five-digit product 
classes; (5) three alternative diversification measures--
the percent of shipments outside the firm's primary 
four-digit, primary three-digit, and primary two-digit SIC 
categories in 1950; (6) market growth in demand measured 
by a weighted average growth in shipments index from 1947 
to 1950 for the product classes of the firm; and (7) dummy 
variables to represent the influence of variates which 
are expected to influence the research effort of firms 
differently across broad (two-digit SIC) industry groups 
but which are relatively homogeneous among firms primarily 
in the same industry group. 
On the basis of various considerations such as the 
understanding and interpretation of results, the availa-
bility of appropriate probability tests and inferential 
procedures, and the economical use 0£ degrees 0£ freedom, 
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correlation and regression techniques are chosen for the 
multivariate analysis of this study. Regression equations 
and the interpretation of their parameter estimates are 
presented in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
FIRM SIZE, MARKET STRUCTURE AND RESEARCH: 
THE EVIDENCE FROM UNCONSOLIDATED 
FIRM DATA 
Industry structure may be expected to influence the 
innovative performance of the nation's industrial sector 
if.differences in research intensity among firms performing 
organized R&D can be explained by differences in their 
industrial environments. More specifically, the results 
of a least squares multivariate, cross-section analysis 
of the sample of 181 large R&D-performing firms provide 
empirical evidence of the separate influences of firm size, 
market share, concentration, diversification, and market 
growth on technical research, while holding the level of 
scientific and technological opportunity constant. 
In this chapter correlation techniques are used when 
it is desirable to determine preliminary interrelationships 
and associations among different variables$ Major emphasis, 
however, is placed on regression techniques, which not only 
allow a relaxation of the assumption of multivariate 
normality, but are particularly useful in explaining the 
relationships among the variables when the direction of 
causation is assumed. In this study the directi~n of 
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causation is hypothesized to be ,from the independent vari-
ables measuring a firm's size and market structure to the 
dependent variable measuring its research effort. The 
hypothesized relations are tested on a basis of the para-
meter estimates of appropriate regression equations. 
The Regression Model 
The following additive regression model is used to 
explain differences in research intensity among firms by 
differences in their industrial structures: 
Ri/Ni b ·d· . + u. J lj 1 
where Riis the number of persons employed by the ith firm 
in its R&D laboratory or laboratories in 1950; Ni is total 
employment in thousands for the ith firm in 1950; log Ai 
is the logarithm of total assets in millions of dollars 
for the ith firm in 1950; Mi is the average market share 
of the ith firm in 1950 expressed as a percentage; C. is 
.J. 
the average (weighted by 1950 shipments) 1954 four-firm 
concentration ratio or 1954 eight-firm concentration ratio 
for the ith firm's markets in 1950; Di is the percent of 
the firm's 1950 shipments outside of its primary four-digit 
SIC category, outside of its primary three-digit SIC 
category, or outside its primary two-digit SIC category; 
Gi is an average growth index for the ith firm's markets 
between the years 1947 and 1950; dij are dummy variables 
with a value of 1 if the ith firm is in the jth two-digit 
SIC category and O otherwise; and U· 1 is the error term, 
assumed random with zero expected value and constant 
. 1 
variance. 
The Question of Collinearity: Absolute 
Size Versus Diversification and 
Structural Market Power 
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In arguing that extremely large firms are necessary 
to offset the costs and risks of research and development, 
it is frequently assumed that large firms are invariably 
large in relation to their markets and are typically 
characterized by more diversified resources. While this 
assertion is probably valid in contrasting large firms with 
small firms, the correlation hetween absolute firm size 
and market share, market concentration, or diversification 
is not expected to be as high among only large firms. If, 
indeed, firm size is highly correlated with the other 
1Empirical studies which have formulated a relation 
between firm size and innovative performance have found 
the error terms of untransformed linear regressions of the 
absolute size variable to be heteroscedastic and the 
observations of extremely large firms to dominate the 
regression estimates. The expression of the dependent 
variable as a ratio to measure research intensity has the 
effect, however, of correcting for heteroscedasticity. 
The absolute size variable is expressed as a logarithm to 
reduce the effect of extreme values when estimating the 
influence of firm size on research intensity. See John 
R. Meyer and Edwin Kuh, The Investment Decision (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 265-66. 
For a discussion of the merits of this model versus 
a·multiplicative model, see F. M. Scherer, "Market 
Structure and the Employment of Scientists and Engineers," 
American Economic Review, LVII (June, 1967), 525-26. 
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independent variables in the model depicting market share, 
market concentration, or diversification, then doubt is 
cast on the ability to separate the influences of each 
of these market structural variables from that of absolute 
size per se. 
Table 12 presents the simple correlation coefficients 
between firm size and measures of market share, concentra-
tion, and diversification. Firm size is measured by both 
TABLE XII 
SIMPLE LINEAR CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN FIRM SIZE 
AND MARKET SlfARE, CONCENTRATION, OR DIVERSIFICATION 
Assets 
Log c ~ssets 
Market share 
0.358 
0.386 
Concentrationa Diversificationb 
0.113 -0.073 
0.144 -0.080 
aEqual to the weighted average four-firm concentration 
ratio for the firm's market. 
bEqual to the percent of shipments outside the firm's 
primary three-digit SIC category. 
cThe log variable is less dominated by extreme values 
and better satisfies the assumption of normality than does 
the untransformed variable. 
total assets and the logarithm of total assets, a measure 
which better satisfies the assumption of normality since 
it is less dominated by extreme values. The measure of 
concentration chosen is the average four-firm concentration 
ratio. The percent of shipments outside the firm's primary 
three-digit SIC category is used to depict diversification. 
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While the correlation coefficients between the 
measures of firm size and market share are statistically 
significant at the .01 level, their relationship is not so 
strong that the separate influences of each of the two 
variables on the innovative performance of the firms sampled 
cannot be estimated. 
Positive correlation does not, of course, mean 
causality. Nevertheless, it can generally be interpreted 
that an increase in firm size results in an increase in 
discretionary market power, that is, size in relation to 
the market. For the 181 large firms in the sample only 
13 percent of the variation in average market share can 
be explained by the variation in absolute firm size 
measured by total assets. Hence, it appears that, while 
not mutually exclusive, the traditional distinction between 
absolute size and size in relation to the market is relevant~.2 
The correlation coefficients in Table 12 also indicate 
that the distinction between "bigness" and "fewness" is 
valid among the largest firms. The tendency for larger 
firms to operate in more concentrated markets increases 
only modestly among the 18.1 large firms in the sample. 
Furthermore, while it is generally true that the number of 
product markets of a firm increases with its size (a linear 
correlation between total assets and the number of product 
2other variables affecting a firm's market share are, 
of course, the number of its markets and the total size 
of each of its markets. 
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markets contributing more than 1 percent to the firm's 
total shipments was found to be .35), the percentage of 
nonprimary shipments among the firms sampled is independent 
. 3 
of size. 
The Empirical Results 
Table 13 summarizes the results of several multiple 
regression equations based upon the additive ratio model 
relating several structural variables to the research 
intensity of individual firms. In each of the equations 
the dependent variable is the number employed by the 
company in its R&D laboratories per 1,000 total company 
employees. In equations A through C the same independent 
variables are introduced with the exception of the measure 
of firm diversification, which is measured by the percent 
of the firm's shipments outside its primary four-digit SIC 
category in equation A, outside its primary three-digit 
category in equation B, and outside its primary two-digit 
category in equation C. Equation D introduces the eight-
firm concentration ratio rather than the four-firm con-
centration ratio in equation B. Equation E introduces the 
square of the four-firm concentration ratio as a new variable 
along with the other variables in equation B. Also 
3This result is in agreement with that found by 
Michael Gort for the percent of nonprimary employment by 
741 large firms in 1954 in Diversification and Integration 
in American Industry (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1962), pp. 65-74. 
TABLE 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERR.ORS FOR ADDITIVE 
181 LARGE RESEARCH-PERFORMING FIRMS BY SELECTED 
Perce.nt of 
Equa- Inter- Log A Market Concentrat:ton ratios outside 
tion cept share 4-finu 3..:fix111 4,...f irm 4:...digit 3..:d:i..git 
(food) squared 
A 3.663 1.191 -0.038 -0 .010 0.087 
(3 .393) (O .207) (0.141) (0 .078) 
B 5 .071 1.839 -0.057 -0.020 0,095 
(3.424) (0.209) (0.139) (0.087) 
c 8.785 1.020 0.004 -0.048 
(3.444) (0.212) (0.142) 
D 7 .696 1. 754 -0 .036 -0.062 0 .092 
(3.405) (0.200) (0 .136) (O .088) 
E -7.539 1.513 -0.057 0.416 -0.004 0.080 
(3.455) (0.209) (O .623) (0.005) (0,091) 
F 17 .403 -0 .134 -0.219 -0 .351 *0.190 
(3, 726) (0.228 (0.166) (0.093) 
G 21.399 0.333 -0 .. 206 -0.270 *0.243 
(3, 729) (0,226) (O .163) (0 .103) 
H 27.112 -0.836 -0.153 -0.321 
(3. 781) (0. 230) (0.166) 
I 22.901 1.235 -0 .. 305 -0.185 *0.252 
(3. 715) (0 .213) (0 .167) (0 .103) 
J -10.081 -0.791 -0.193 0,817 -0.009 0.196 
(3.806) (0.226) (0.798) (0.006) (0.108) 
* Significant at the .05 level 
The standard errors are in parentheses below their corresponding 
XIII 
MODEL EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN RESEARCH INTENSITY AMONG 
VARIABLES CHARACTERIZING THEIR INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENTS 
shipments 
prilnary 
2-digit 
-0.062 
(0,110) 
0.007 
(0.137) 
Market 
growth 
Dummy variables for same technology in 
Chemi- Petro- Stone, Primary Motor 
cals leum clayt metals vehicles 
glass 
-2 R 
0,018 *38.499 *16.428 0,085 -5.192 1.297 .4420 
(0,066) (4.652) (5.734) (5.666) (5 569) (6.970) 
0.016 *37.587 *14.165 -0.895 -6.376 -0.276 .4418 
(0.066) (4.912) (5.817) (5,732) (5,932) (7.IOl) 
0.013 *40.266 *16,232 0.461 -2.915 2.469 .4285 
(0.067) (4.704) (5.827) (5.730) (5.640) (7.350) 
0.019 *37,718 *14.730 -0.890 -6.128 0.240 .4424 
(0,065) (4.911) (5.946) (5.714) (5.956) (6.948) 
0.028 *37.287 *13.707 -0.666 -6.749 0,072 .4402 
(0.069) (4.937) (5,860) (5.750) (5.960) (7.130) 
0.113 
(0 .075) 
0,088 
(O .076) 
0.119 
(0.077) 
0,056 
(O .072) 
0.120 
(0.079) 
,0404 
,0480 
.0174 
,0396 
,0585 
regression coefficients, 
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included in each of these five equations are the index of 
market growth for the firm and intercept dummy variables 
for each two-digit SIC category with the exception of food 
products which assumes the value of the intercept in order 
to avoid a singular matrix. Equations F-J are identical 
with equations A-E, respectively, except that the dummy 
variables are omitted. 
The Influence of Firm Size 
Although the structural advantages of size forresearch 
are often cited in association with the other variables in 
the model depicting market share, diversification, and 
oligopoly, increased firm size may have a favorable effect 
on a firm's research effort net of these other influences. 
Larger firms with larger total R&D programs can be expected 
to balance successes against failures and, therefore, 
receive a more predictable return on their investmentn 
If firms are risk averters, that is, they place a premium 
on the reduction of uncertainty, then investment in risky 
research may be relatively more attractive to larger firms. 
Furthermore, larger firms may be better able to absorb 
market introduction costs, such as promotion and distribu-
tion expenses, necessary to exploit commercially their 
innovations. 
To test the hypothesis that firm size has a favorable 
influence on research intensity, net of its relation with 
the other structural variables, the logarithm of total 
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assets is introduced as an independent variable in the 
additive multiple regression model. 4 If the proportion of 
resources allocated toward R&D increases with the size of 
the firm, the partial regression coefficient for the size 
variable is expected to be significantly positive. Among 
the equations summarized in Table 13, the regression 
coefficients for the absolute size variable are not 
statistically significant. Hence, it can be concluded 
that, other things equal, firm size per se has no influence 
on the proportion of resources which research-performing 
firms allocate to R&D. 5 
The Influence of Market Power 
The Schumpeterian hypothesis asserts that monopoly 
power has a favorable influence on the innovative effort 
of a firm by providing protection against the temporary 
disorganization of the market necessary for long-range 
investment, while increasing the supply of internal funds. 
4The logarithm of assets is used rather than the 
absolute value because the distribution is less skewed. 
This technique is also used by Edwin Mansfield in "Firm 
S i z e , Ma r k e t S t r u c tu r e ., and I n nova t i on , " J oy r n a 1 of 
Political Economy, LXXI (December, 1963), 556-76~ 
5when only professional research personnel per 1,000 
company employees is introduced as an alternative dependent 
variable in each of the equations in Table 13, the regres-
sion coefficients of the logarithm of assets are found 
to be negative but not statistically significant. The 
reduced importance of firm size is explained by the fact 
that the ratio of supporting personnel to research 
professionals increases, on the average, with firm size. 
See supra, pp. 46-50. 
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To test this hypothesis the partial influence of a firm's 
market share on its research intensity is estimated in 
each of the equations in Table 13. In each case firm 
market share is found to be an insignificant factor in 
explaining differences in research intensity among the 
firms sampled. Furthermore, in all but one of the equations 
market share is found to be negatively related to research 
intensity. From these results, therefore, there is no 
evidence that the Schumpeterian hypothesis holds among 
the large firms in the sample. 
A neo-Schumpeterian hypothesis of perhaps more 
interest to antitrust policy is that, given the firms' 
own market shares, those operating in more highly concen-
trated, oligopolistic markets are expected to display a 
special affinity toward technological . . 6 1nnovat1on. As the 
market share of the dominant few firms increases and 
pricing interdependence becomes fully recognized, so the 
argument goes, firms are compelled to grapple for their 
market position through more complex innovative and other 
nonprice competitive strategies. 7 If this hypothesis 
holds, the average concentration of the firm's markets is 
6A firm's market share and the share held by the top 
several firms are not independent since a firm may at times 
also be a dominant producer. The simple correlation 
coefficients between market share and four-firm or eight-
firm concentration ratios are .40 and .33, respectively. 
7Henry H. Villard, "Competition, Oligopoly, and 
Research," Journal of Political Economy, LXVI (December, 
1958), 483-97. 
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expected to have a significant positive influence on 
research intensity. In equations A through E, however, 
the average four-firm market concentration ratio for the 
firm's markets is found to have no significant influence 
on its research intensity. 
In the additive model a linear relationship is assumed 
between research intensity dnd market concentration. 
However, it is possible that a nonlinear relationship 
exists between the two variables. In particular, it has 
been hypothesized that moderate levels of concentration 
beyond some threshold ]evel may be preferable over com-
pletely atomistic markets as an incentive for firms to 
innovate, but after concentration exceeds some optimum 
level the group discipline present when pricing interdepend-
ence becomes recognized may be extended into other areas 
of firm behavior, including technological innovation. 8 
To test this hypothesis equation E introduces the 
square of the concentration ratio as an additional variable 
in equation B. If the relationship is curvilinear of the 
form described above, then the net regression curve relating 
concentration to research intensity would be a parabola 
which is concave to the concentration axis. A comparison 
of the estimated net relationship between market concen-
tration and research intensity rPvcals a better fit when 
8.see S h r , _ c e er, American Econ?mi_c Rcvi.ew, LVII, pp a 
524-31. 
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a nonlinear relationship is hypothesized, although the 
total unexplained variance is not significantly changed 
when the concentration ratio squared, ci 2 , is added to the 
regression equation. Nevertheless, the partial regression 
coefficient for ci 2 is negative, indicating a curve which, 
if anything, is concave to the concentration . 9 axis. 
Since this hypothesis is important for determining 
a possible optimal level of industrial concentration for 
research and development, it deserves additional attention. 
Figure 1 describes the net regression curves (the influence 
of the other variables held constant at their means) 
relating concentration to research intensity. The equations 
represented in their linear and nonlinear forms are, 
respectively, 
R/N = 23. 63 0.0204 C 
and R/N = 11.73 + 0.4163 c - 0.0037 c 2 
The nonlinear equation reaches a maximum at a concentration 
level of 56 percent. Although this finding may not be 
significant in itself, it gains added significance in that 
it closely agrees with the results of Scherer, who estimates 
an optimal concentration for research of from 50 to 55 
percent using cross industry data. Hence, while the 
9Although the regression coefficients for Ci and ci 2 
are not significant according to conventional t ratio 
standards, their standard errors are expanded due to the 
high correlation between the two variables (r = .98). 
Hence, the standard error for Ci increases from 0.139 to 
0.623 when ci 2 is added to r~gression equation. 
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results must be taken as tentative, a "suggested" optimal 
four-firm concentration ratio £or research may occur 
10 between 50 and 60 percent. 
Figure !.--Linear and nonlinear net regression 
curves relating concentration and 
research intensitya 
R&D employed I 1,000 
total employed 
40.0 
30.0 
- --
----
--.?<::: 20.0 
10.0 
0 
0 50 
£our-firm 
concentra-
100 tion ratio 
aThe frequency distribution of observed values £or 
concentration begins at a value of 29 percent. Hence, there 
is no method to determine the shape 0£ the regression curve 
below this level. 
lOAlthough the estimated maximum is slightly higher 
than Scherer's, it is based upon a weighted average 0£ more 
narrowly defined markets. Since Scherer defines industries 
on a, more or less, three-digit SIC level, his concentration 
ratios are generally below those used in this study. 
Scherer, American Economic Review, LVII, 524-31. 
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When th.e dummy variables are omitted in equation F 
through J, the regression coefficients take on the same 
signs as in equations A through E, respectively; however, 
the regression coefficients for the four-firm concentration 
ratio in equations F-H and the regression coefficient for 
the four-firm concentration ratio squared in equation J 
are significant at the 10 percent level in a one-tailed 
test. Further analysis reveals that the dummy variables 
and four-firm concentration ratio compete for explanatory 
power because they are negatively correlated. Table 14 
presents the average research intensity and average market 
concentration for firms primarily in the same two-digit 
industry group. It is evident that the more research 
intensive chemical firms operate in markets which are 
slightly less concentrated, on the average, than the full 
sample mean. Firms in the less research intensive motor 
vehicle industry, on the other hand, operate in markets 
which are, on the average, more concentrated than the full 
sample mean. 11 
In the additive model it is assumed that differences 
in the slope parameters relating market concentration to 
!!Although the negative relation between average 
research intensity and average concentration among firms 
across two-digit SIC categories contrasts with the findings 
of Scherer, the conflict can be explained by the fact 
that Scherer's cross-industry sample includes nearly all 
of manufacturing and, hence, his group average is lower 
than among the industry categories selected in this study. 
Ibid., p. 529. 
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TABLE XIV 
AVERAGE RESEARCH INTENSITY 
OF FIRMS BY TWO-DlGIT SIC 
AND AVERAGE MARKET CONCENTRATION 
INDUSTRY GROUP AND TOTAL SAMPLE 
Average 
Number Average firm 
of research concentration 
Industry firms intensity ratio 
Foods 42 9.39 53.62 
Chemicals 49 49.42 51.59 
Petroleum 27 26.32 49.19 
Stone, clay, glass 19 9.61 57.37 
Primary metals 24 6.33 55.21 
Motor vehicles 20 11.12 74.05 
Total sample 181 22.54 55.27 
research intensity are constant among different industry 
groups. There is reaso~ to expect, however, that the 
importance of concentration for research varies according 
to the type of research performed. In particular, Comanor's 
findings suggest that there may be an interaction between 
concentration and product differentiation in their influence 
on research spending. More specifically, concentration 
may be positively related to research in industries which 
produce relatively homogeneous material inputs but unrelated 
to research in industries which are characterized by a 
high degree of product differentiation. 12 
12william Comanor, "Market Structure, Product 
Differentiation, and Industrial Research," The Quarterly 
Journal of Eionomics, LXXXI, No. 4 (Novembe~ 1967), 639-57. 
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To examine the possibility that the importance of 
concentration for research depends upon the degree of 
product differentiation, the total sample is stratified 
into three subsamples according to the degree of product 
differentiation expected for the firm's products. In each 
subsample intercept dummy variables are used, when neces-
sary, to separate two-digit SIC industry groups, but each 
subsample is allowed to take its own best-fitting slope 
coefficients. The first subsample consists of firms 
primarily in foods and motor vehicles and equipment, two 
industries which deal primarily with consumer goods which 
13 
are generally more differentiable than producer goods. 
The second subsample consists of firms primarily in 
chemicals. The degree of product differentiation among 
chemical firms is heterogeneous, varying from cosmetics 
and drugs which are highly differentiable to industrial 
chemicals which are not. Finally, firms primarily in 
petroleum; stone, clay, and glass; and primary metals are 
combined into a third subsample. Product differentiation 
13Although Comanor includes consumer nondurables with 
material inputs and consumer durables with investment 
goods for the purpose of obtaining two groups which are 
characterized by different degrees of product differentia-
tion, his choice is somewhat arbitrary and is based upon 
Bain's mentioning of only three nondurables consumer 
goods industries in which product differentiation is 
slight. Ibid., p. 648. 
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in these material input industries is expected to be slight 
or 1 . "bl 14 neg 1g1 e. 
When multiple regression equations are estimated for 
each subsample of the same form as equations A through E 
in Table 13, the partial regression coefficients for the 
four-firm concentration ratio and, alternatively, the 
eight-firm concentration ratio are not satistically signi£-
icant. Similarly, when a quadratic relationship is 
hypothesized neither the four-firm concentration ratio 
nor the four-firm concentration ratio squared are £ound 
15 
to be significant in any of the three subsamples. 
Hence, it may be concluded on a basis of these results, 
that market concentration is unimportant for research, 
regardless of the degree of product differentiation in the 
industry. 
14For a discussion of the importance of product 
differentiation among industries see Joe s. Bain, Industrial 
Organization (New York: Wiley, 1959), pp. 218-35. 
15 The net regression curves relating concentration 
to research intensity, analogous to equations Band E in 
Table 13, for the subsample of firms in the material 
input industries, the group for which Comanor found con-
centration to be significant, are as follows: 
R/N = 15.47 - 0.0108 C and 
(0.197) 
R/N = -3.16 + 0.6703 C - 0.0059 c2 
(0.932) (0.008) 
The nonlinear function reaches a maximum research intensity 
when the four-firm concentration ratio is 57. 
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The Influence of Diversification 
Richard Nelson has developed the hypothesis that 
industrial diversification should stimulate innovation. 16 
Research, particularly basic research, Nelson noted, is 
likely to lead to unpredictable discoveries in a variety of 
fields. A widely diversified firm is in a better position 
than a more specialized firm to recognize and to exploit 
the commercial possibilities of such discoveries. Other 
things equal, therefore, diversified firms are expected to 
engage in proportionally more research because a given R&D 
outlay has a higher probability of success. 
To test this hypothesis three multiple regression 
equations are estimated with all independent variables the 
same except the measure of diversification. For equation 
A diversification is measured by the percent of the firm's 
shipments outside its primary four-digit SIC category. In 
equation B diversification is measured by the percent of 
shipments outside the firm's more broadly defined primary 
three-digit SIC category. Finally, in equation C diversi-
fication is measured by the percent of the firm's shipments 
outside its still broader primary two-digit SIC category. 
Sinee each successive measure represents the percent of the 
firm's shipments in less homogeneous markets, they measure 
16 Richard R. Nelson, "The Simple Economics of Basic 
Research," Jouy:nal of Politic_a1 __ Eco~9!11,Y, LXVII (June, 1959), 
297-306. 
different degrees of heterogeneity for the firm. More 
precisely, the third measure depicts a greater degree of 
heterogeneity than the second which, in turn, depicts 
greater heterogeneity than the first. 
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The partial regression coefficients in equations A 
through Care not statistically significant; however, the 
three-digit diversification measure in equation Bis greater 
than the four-digit measure in equation A. As heterogeneity 
increases beyond the two-digit level, however, the regres-
sion coefficient not only declines but becomes negative. 
A comparison of the regression coefficients in equations 
A through C with those in equations F through H, respec-
tively, reveals that when the dummy variables are omitted, 
the regression coefficients for the three diversification 
measures increase, and they follow the same pattern relative 
to each other in each set of equations. This pattern 
occurs because, as shown in Table 15, the dummy variables 
representing two-digit SIC industry groups are positively 
correlated with each measure of diversification. The 
research intensive chemical firms are, on the average, 
more diversified than the full sample mean. In contrast, 
the less research intensive food companies tend to be 
less diversified, on the average, than the full sample 
mean. It should be noted, however, that the primary metals 
firms are, on the average, the least research intensive 
but are more diversified, on the average, than the full 
sample mean. 
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TABLE XV 
AVERAGE RESEARCH HITENSITY AW> AVERAGE DIVERSIFICATION, 
ijY INDUSTRY GROUPS AND TOTAL SAMPLE 
'. 
: . ·, 
~ Number Average Average percent of firip's 
of research shipment outside primary 
Industry firms intensity 4-digi·ts' 3-digits 2-digits 
Food 42 9.39 29.91 10.69 3.25 
Chemical 49 49.42 40.78 30 .17 12.27 
Petroleum 27 26.32 19.28 19.28 9.37 
Stone, clay, 
glass 19 9.61 28.12 21.85 11.11 
Primary metals. 24 6.33 44.09 35.10 13.92 
Motor vehicles 20 11.12 19.85 19.31 14.63 
Total sample 181 22 .54 31.85 22.60 10.10 
It can be concluded from these results that diversified 
firms are likely to invest in a higher proportion of re-. 
search, but the advantages of diversification for research 
occur among technically related product markets within the 
same two-digit SIC industry group. There is no indication 
that increased "conglomerateness" per se increases a 
f . ' h . h 17 1rm s emp as1s on researc • 
17 f . When only pro ess1onal research personnel per 1,000 
total employees is introduced as the dependent variable in 
equations A through J, the regression coefficients exhibit 
the same general pattern; however, the regression coeffi-
cients are more significant. Hence, the regression 
coefficient for the second diversification measure in 
equation Bis significant at the 10 percent level in a 
one-tailed test and the t ratios for the other diversifica-
tion variables are correspondingly higher. If the number 
of professi6nals is more closely aligned to risky re~earch 
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The Influe~ce of Market Growth 
Rapidly growing markets are likely to be characterized 
by changing technologies which offer strong inducements to 
entry in the form of gains to innovating firms. Since a 
period of time will normally elapse between the adjustment 
of supply to rapidly growing demand, the profit rate of 
firms in rapidly growing markets are expected to be higher 
than for the economy as a whole. Rapidly growing markets 
also afford a new firm greater opportunity of achieving a 
significant scale of output while diminishing the necessity 
of encroaching on the markets of established firms. 
Not only are effective barriers to entry lessened in 
rapidly growing markets, but the behavior of established 
firms in such markets is likely to differ in response to 
other market structural influences. In particular, the 
interdependence among firms in highly concentrated markets 
is expected to diminish in growing markets because the 
"size of the pie" is increasing. Firms may have a greater 
incentive to act competitively if they can expect to 
increase their sales without provoking response from their 
rivals. 18 It follows, therefore, that in examining 
than the total number of R&D employees, this result suggests 
that diversification may be more important for research 
than for development expenditures. 
l8see Richard Caves, American Industry: Structure, 
·~~~~~"'--~~~~~~~ 
Conduct, and Performance (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 29-30. 
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market structural influences market growth should be held 
constant. 
The inclusion of the market growth variable also 
provides information on the relation between market growth 
and a firm's research intensity. Although the regression 
coefficients in Table 13 for the market growth variable are 
not significant, further analysis reveals that the market 
growth variable also competes for explanatory power with 
the dummy variable because they are positively correlated. 
When the dummy variibles are omitted from the regression 
equations A-E in Table 13, the regression coefficients for 
market growth increase. Although markets in more research 
intensive industries generally grow more rapidly, the 
causal direction between market growth and research inten-
sity is not firmly established. While rapidly growing 
markets.may encourage more R&D, investments in new and 
improved products and processes generally lead to more 
rapid increases in market sales. 
Scientific and Technological Opportunity 
The dummy variables to depict technological 
opportunity and other variables, such as factor proportions, 
are found to be significant in the ch~mical and petroleum 
industries but not in the other industry groups sampled. 
Hence, the expected values of research intensity, net of 
the influence of the independent variables measuring size 
and market structure, for firms in the chemical and petroleum 
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industries are significantly greater than for firms in the 
other industry groups sampled. 
Summary 
The multivariate cross-section analysis presented in 
this chapter provides a basis for testing several hypotheses 
relating a firm's size and market structure to its innova-
tive performance. More precisely, the net influences of 
a firm's size, market share, the level of concentration 
of its markets, and the diversi£ication of its resources 
on the number employed in its R&D laboratories per 1,000 
total employees are estimated, holding the influence of its 
average growth in market demand and technological opportu-
nity constant. 
Firm size oer se is found to have no significant 
positive influence on the proportion of resources allocated 
to research among the major industries sampled. This 
result is not surprising since it generally agrees with 
that of other researchers who have estimated the influence 
of firm size on research intensity among large research-
performing firms. Of more interest than the effect of 
size is the possible influence of several market structural 
variables on a firm's research intensity, holding firm 
size constant. 
The first hypothesis concerning the influence of 
market structure is that of Schumpeter, who argues that a 
firm's monopoly power increases its incentive and ability 
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to invest venture capital in new innovations. If the 
hypothesis is true, then the research intensity of the 
fir~ is expect~d to increase with its average market share. 
Among the 181 industrial firms sampled, however, market 
share is found to have no significant influence on R&D 
employment per 1,000 total employees. 
A neo-Schumpeterian hypothesis relates the innovative 
performance of the firm to the concentration of its markets. 
The avoidance of price competition in highly concentrated, 
oligopolistic markets, so the argument goes, creates a 
competitive drive to seek new and improved products. If 
this hypothesis is true, then the research intensity of 
the firms sampled is expected to increase with the average 
concentration of their markets. The net influence of 
concentration on research intensity in both a linear and 
nonlinear model is found to be statistically insignificant 
according to conventional standards; however, there is 
modest support for the hypothesis that moderate levels of 
concentration may be more conducive to research than 
either very low or very high levels of concentration. 
A third hypothesis assigns a potentially important 
role to diversification as a stimulus to innovation. As 
a risk averter, a conglomerate firm will presumably engage 
more readily in uncertain research since it can expect to 
make commercial use of a higher proportion of unexpected 
discoveries. The estimated influences on research inten-
sity of three alternative measures of firm diversification 
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which depict progressively greater heterogeneity suggest, 
however, that the advantages of diversification for research 
generally occur within technically related markets. 
Of the remaining variables included in the multiple 
regression analysis, the dummy variables separating the 
firms into two-digit SIC industry groups according to their 
primary markets are found to be significant for the 
chemical and petroleum firms. Although the interfirm 
variance in average market growth is not important in 
explaining variation in firm innovative performance within 
two-digit industries, it is found to be an additional 
variable which, like diversification, is positively 
associated with the level of scientific and technological 
opportunity in the firm's major industry group. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The essential thrust of this study has been to clarify 
the role of the industrial firm, typically operating in a 
number of product markets, on the technical progress of 
the nation's ·industrial system. Because of the availability 
of unconsolidated market data for a number of research-
performing corporations it has been possible to estimate 
the separate influences of market structural variables, 
often assumed to be ~ighly correlated with firm size, on 
a firm's innovative performance. 
Of particular importance for antitrust policy is the 
assertion, popularized most recently by Galbraith, 1 that 
traditional antitrust policy concerned with promoting 
competition through the diffusion of market power is 
obsolete when dealing with the large technically oriented 
firms. According to this view the costs and risks of 
modern technology dictate enormous industrial complexes 
and high levels of market concentration in order to guar-
antee the resources and planning necessary for technological 
innovation. 
1John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967). 
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While the results of empirical studies relating 
absolute firm size to innovative performance are fairly 
consistent, the empirical findings of studies relating 
market concentration to innovative performance have been 
mixed. The inconsistency in the latter findings can 
undoubtedly be traced to the shortcomings of market data 
for multimarket firms reporting consolidated financial 
statements. Hence, measures of absolute firm size are 
readily available, but in determining the influence of the 
distribution of firm sizes within an industry on the 
industry's level and intensity of technological innovation, 
researchers have been forced to rely on aggregates of 
consolidated firm data classified by the primary activity 
of the reporting company. 2 If the industries examined 
are defined too narrowly, then much of the R&D activities 
of multiindustry firms may be directed toward products 
outside the industry. If broad industry categories are 
examined, then most of the aggregated firm's product sales 
fall within one category but in varying proportions among 
the submarkets within the categories. 
In the present study the problem of secondary markets 
of the firm is solved by treating each firm as a separate 
observation. Not only are budget decisions regarding 
investment in research expected to be made at the firm 
2oata on innovative performance classified on an 
establishment basis are not available. 
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level, but each multiple product firm faces~ more or les~ 
unique set of market environmental con~itions, depending 
on the nature and extent of its conglomeration. Utilizing 
unpublished data gathered by the Federal Trade Commissipn 
on the separate markets of individual firms, it has been 
possibie to quantify a number of the structural influences 
bt assuming that the impact of each of a firm's markets 
on its research performance depends on the relative impor-
tance of each market for the firm's total operation. 
Hence, importance is attached not only to a firm's primary 
market but to its nonprimary markets as well. The multiple 
regression equations estimated from unconsolidated firm 
data provide more meaningful estimates of the influence 
of market structure on the innovative performance of large 
firms than were heretofore available from the analysis of 
published data on industry aggregates. 
Turning first to the relation between absolute firm 
size and technological innovation, empirical evidence 
reveals that, while firm size may be a major determinant 
of whether or not firms perform organized research, an 
increase in firm size per se does not lead to a more than 
proportional increase in innovative effort among the 
research-performing firms examined in this study. Among 
firms engaged primarily in company-financed R&D, therefore, 
increased firm size cannot be expected to lead to more 
research. It appears, therefore, that the technological 
necessities of large size are applicable, at most, to only 
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a ·limited number of complicated large scale techniques 
generally supported by government funds. To argue that 
only large mature corporations are ~apable of significant 
innovative activity in today's industrial system is to 
overlook the sources of many of the significant technical 
3 
advances of this century. 
Even if the largest firms possess certain unique 
technological potentialities relative to smaller firms, 
there is no guarantee that such firms will undertake the 
desired research effort. The costs and risks of innovative 
activity are largely determined by the magnitude of the 
advance sought. Larger firms with conservative managements 
may avoid major advances and center their attention on 
minor product improvements necessary to maintain a technical 
parity with other firms in their markets unless they are 
forced to innovate under the pressure of effective compet-
itive market forces. 
There is considerable disagreement, however, on what 
constitutes a "competitive" market environment for indus-
trial firms •. Advocates of the view that both "bigness" 
and "fewness" are desirable conditions for research, 
contend that although highly concentrated markets may lead 
firms to shrink from price competition, nonprice competition, 
3see, for example, John Jewkes, David Sawers, and 
Richard Stillerman, The Sources of Invention (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1958) for evidence of the origin of 
many significant inventions during the 1900-1950 period. 
including t~chnical rivalry, will flourish. Hence, the 
competitive vigor of an industry is supposedly enhanced 
by high levels of market concentration if competitive 
behavior is judged in terms of both price and nonprice 
rivalry. 
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Opponents of this view contend that while completely 
atomistic markets may not be conducive to privately-
sponsored research, an increase in market concentration 
beyond moderately low levels not only fails to encourage 
innovative effort, but the implicit collusive price behavior 
among firms in highly concentrated markets may be extended 
to other forms of competitive behavior as well, notably 
rivalry in research. Firms in highly concentrated markets 
may avoid major technical advances in favor of the "quiet 
life," while characteristically high barriers to entry 
remove the stimulus to innovation in the form of new 
entrants capitalizing on a new idea. Hence, an effective 
competitive environment is not composed of only a few 
large firms but consists of a diffusion of economic market 
power among medium- and small-sized firms in addition to 
large firms. 
The empirical results of this study lend modest 
support to the latter hypothesis that a nonlinear relation 
exists between a firm's research effort and the concentra-
tion of its markets. Hence, neither very low nor extremely 
high levels of market concentration are conducive to 
research. Although tentative, the results suggest that a 
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possible optimal level of market concentration may occur 
when the largest four firms in a market possess between 
50 and 60 percent of its sales. It should be mentioned, 
however, that in increasing the amount of nonprice 
competition in an industry there may be a decline in price 
competitiono 
Related to and accompanying the emphasis upon indus-
trial research and development among modern industrial 
corporations has been a movement toward greater diversi-
fication. Although expenditures on research and development 
provide a basis for diversification through lnternal growth, 
the history of most large firms reveals that they have 
achieved their diversified market structures largely 
through acquisitions. This latter alternative not only 
avoids early competitive struggles in a new market but may 
provide the firm with a patent base or experienced research 
personnel it can use for further product development. 
Although but one of many possible reasons for diversifica-
tion through merger, the acquiring of an established firm 
can remove a substantial portion of the initial costs and 
4 
risks of entering new product markets. Having established 
a broad product base and a variety of productive resource~, 
the conglomerate firm may be able to make profitable use 
4For a more comprehensive argument relating R&D to 
mergers see Murry N. Friedman, "The Research and Develop-
ment Factor in Mergers and Acquisitions," in Study No. 16 
of the U.S. Senate, Subcommitte~ on Patents, Trademarks, 
and Copyright~, 85th Cong. 2nd sess., 1958, pp. 1-35. 
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of a higher percentage of its research projects. Other 
things equal, therefore, the more heterogeneous the firm's 
existing product markets the higher the proportion of 
resources the firm is expected to allocate to research. 
The validity of the above hypothesis is partly 
supported by the empirical results of this study. Hence, 
more diversified firms tend to be more research intensive. 
However, the advantages of diversification for research 
are probably greatest within technically related areas. 
This conclusion is borne out by the fact that firms do riot 
have to have widely heterogeneous markets or be extremely 
large to receive the advantages of diversification for 
research. 
In summary, the results of this study suggest that 
the size of a firm and the structure of its markets have 
an influence on the proportion of its resources allocated 
toward research. However, the influence of these structural 
variables are of too small a magnitude to suggest that 
public policy deliberately alter the industrial structure 
to meet certain prescribed conditions. Most significant 
in these findings in the fact that upper limits exist on 
the favorable influence of each of the structural variables. 
Hence, firm size is important for undertaking research, 
but while its importance varies among the firm's primary 
operations, there is no evidence that firms need to be 
extremely large to achieve the advantages of scale. 
Although increases in concentration beyond extremely low 
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levels may stimulate research, this does not imply that 
industries should be allowed to reach extremely high levels 
of concentration. Indeed, if market concentration becomes 
too high it is possible that technological innovation may 
decline. Finally, while diversification may be important 
in opening up new investment opportunities for research, 
there is little apparent advantage for research in operating 
across heterogeneous markets which aretechnically unrelate~ 
Although these findings suggest that antitrust policy 
directed toward restricting high levels of market and 
aggregate concentration of economic power is not in conflict 
with the goal of promoting technological progress, there 
is a need for additional research on the relation between 
a firm's size and market structure and its emphasis on 
technical research and development based upon more recent 
data. It is also apparent that with the increased 
diversification of large industrial firms the usefulness 
of this research will depend, to a large extent, on its 
ability to analyze every market of the multiple-product 
firm. A contribution of this study has been to suggest 
one possible ~ethod for using unconsolidated sales data 
for conglomerate firms, should such data be made available 
for public use in the future. Furthermore, the findings 
of this study, based upon 1950 data, take on added signif-
icance when compared to the results of other studies based 
upon more recent industry or consolidated firm data. Hence, 
while further research concerning the relation between 
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industry structure and technological performance is desired, 
the findings of this study, like those of most other 
studies, give no indication that the objective of techno-
logical progress requires a major recasting of antitrust 
policy. 
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APPENDIX A 
List of companies in sample, by major industry group 
Food Products, except Beverages 
Swift & Company 
Armour & Company 
National Dairy Products Corporation 
The Borden Company 
General Foods Corporation 
National Biscuit Company 
Wilson & Company Inc. 
Corn Products Refining Company 
American Sugar Refining Company 
H.J. peinz Company 
General Mills, Inc. 
California Packing Corporation 
Standard Brands, Inc. 
Cudahy Packing Company 
Quaker Oats Company 
Carnation Company 
International Milling Company 
William Wrigley, Jr. Company 
Ralston Purina Company 
Hershey Chocolate Corporation 
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Food Products, except Beverages (cont'd) 
Great Western Sugar Company 
Pillsbury Mills, Inc. 
Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. 
Pet Milk Company 
John Morrel & Company, Inc. 
Best Foods, Inc. 
Beech-Nut Packing Company 
Kellogg Company 
Beatrice Foods Company 
National Sugar Refining Company 
United Biscuit Company of America 
Rath Packing Company 
Allied Mills, Inc. 
Clinton Foods, Inc. 
Purity Bakeries Corporation 
Golden State Company, Ltd. 
Oscar Mayer & Company 
Ward Baking Company 
Kingan & Company, Inc. 
Gerber Products Company 
Godchaux Sugars, Inc. 
Penick & Ford, Ltd., Inc. 
Chemicals and Allied Products 
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company 
Union Carbide & Carbon Corporation 
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Chemicals and Allied Products (cont'd) 
Dow Chemical Company 
Monsanto Chemical Company 
General Aniline & Film Corporation 
Diamond Alkali Company 
Mathieson Chemical Corporation 
Rohm & Hass Company 
Commercial Solvents Corporation 
Pennsylvania Salt Manufacturing Company 
Heyden Chemical Corporation 
American Potash & Chemical Corporation 
Hooker Electrochemical Company 
Victor Chemical Works 
Harshaw Chemical Company 
Durez Plastics and Chemical, Inc. 
American Cyanamid Company 
Sterling Drug, Inc. 
Rexall Drug, Inc. 
American Home Products Corporation 
Parke, Davis & Company 
Abbott Laboratories 
E. R. Squibb & Sons 
Merck & Company, Inc. 
Charles Pfizer & Company & Inc. 
Sharp & Dahme, Inc. 
Vick Chemical Company 
Mead Johnson & Company 
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Chemicals and Allied Products (cont'd) 
Smith Kline & French Laboratories 
The Lambert Company 
Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Company 
Sherwin-Williams Company 
·Air Reduction Company, Inc. 
'Archer~Daniels-Midland Company 
Glidden Company 
International Miner~ls & Chemicals Corporation 
Columbia Carbon Company 
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corporation 
'Eagle-Picher Company 
Interchemical Corporation 
American Agricultural Chemical Company 
Davison Chemical Corporation 
Devoe & Raynolds Company, Inc. 
American-Marietta Company 
Sun Chemical Company 
International Salt Company 
Cook Paint & Varnish Company 
Imperial Paper & Color Corporation 
Nopco Chemical Company 
Petroleum and Related Products 
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) 
Standard Oil Company (Indiana) 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Inc. 
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Petroleum and Related Products (cont'd) 
The Texas Company 
Gulf Oil Corporation 
Standard Oil of California 
Cities Service Company 
Sinclair Oil Corporation 
Shell Oil Corporation 
Phillips Petroleum Company 
Atlantic Refining Company 
Union Oil Company of California 
Tide Water Associated Oil Company 
Sun Oil Company 
Pure Oil Company 
Continental Oil Company 
Standard Oil Company (Ohio) 
Skelly Oil Company 
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation 
Lion Oil Company 
The Flintkote Company 
Deep Rock Oil Corporation 
Certain-teed Products Corporation 
Anderson-Prichard Oil Corporation 
Quaker State Oil Refining Corporation 
Bird & Son, Inc. 
Kendall Refining Company 
1.16 
Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
Owens-Illinois Glass Co. 
United States Gypsum Co. 
Johns-Manville Corp. 
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. 
National Gypsum Co. 
Lone Star Cement Corp. 
Corning Glass Works 
Harbison-Walker Refrac. Co. 
Lehigh Portland Cement Co. 
Carborundum Co. 
Ideal Cement Co. 
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. 
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. 
General Refractories Co. 
Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. 
Gladding McBean & Co. 
Medusa Portland Cement Co. 
American Window Glass Co. 
Primary Metal Products 
United States Steel Corporation 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation 
Aluminum Company of America 
Republic Steel Corporation 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation 
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Primary Metal Products (cont~d) 
National Steel Corporation 
Inland Steel Company 
Wheeling Steel Corporation 
Reynold Metals Company 
Scovill Manufacturing Company 
Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation 
American Steel Foundaries 
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. 
United States Pipe and Foundry Company 
Acme Steel Company 
Lukens Steel Company 
National Malleable & Steel Castings Company 
Granite City Steel Company 
Copperweld Steel Company 
Carpenter Steel Company 
Vanadium Corporation of America 
Laclede Steel Company 
Superior Steel Corporation 
-Crucible Steel Co. of America 
Motor Vehicles and Equipment 
General Motors Corporation 
Ford Motor Company 
Chrysler Corporation 
Borg-Warne~ Corporation 
General American Transport Corporation 
118 
Motor Vehicles and Equipm£nt (cont'd) 
The Studebaker Corporation 
Kaiser~Frazer Corporation 
Hudson Motor Car Company 
Packard Motor Car Company 
Briggs Mfg. Co. 
Eaton Mfg. Co. 
White Motor Co. 
Thompson Products, Inc. 
Timken-Detroit Axle Co. 
Houdaille-Hershey Corp. 
Auto Car Co. 
The Weatherhead Company 
Cummins Engine Co., Inc. 
Pacific Car and Foundry Co. 
King-Seeley Corp. 
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APPENDIX B 
UNlTF.I} STATES 01' .1Ji~RlCA 
Fl::J)l:RAL TRADE CCM11SSION 
Wochingtqn 2S, D. C. 
S l'EC!At i'.l:PORT 
SnmY 01' CO~t: 1:,uuff;iy PATTERNS 
Value of Shipau,nta frOUI Manufacturing· 
Eatabli•hlllente ln l9SO 
Name o( O;,erating Coq,oration 
(where different fr(l;ll above) 
Name of Establishoent 
Addreu of E1tabllahm..-nt 
(State) (County) (City) 
Certification 
(t,uaiber) 
Return on• copy o( 
thh report to: 
Bureau o( Indu1tri&l 
Ecol\Ollllc•, Feoeral 
Trade Coaniaaion, 
~aehington 2S, D. C, 
before January l, 19S2 
(Street) 
Thls report haa been preport,d by me or 
vision from records of the above-named 
to be beat of my knowledge and bellef, 
of thla ,orporation from------
under try personal auper-
ccrpo~ation and t.11 correct 
and cc-.:cr1 the operation• 
to-----~--
(Title) (Date) (Signature) 
Value of Total 
Pr!Xloct Ch.111 Shi pn,entll and 
Product . Code Number Interplant 
Tran1fl'n 
(Omit Ce-nta) 
Col., A Col. ll Col. C 
TO?AL ·- ALL PRCDUCTS 
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